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RECONCEIVING COERCION-BASED
CRIMINAL DEFENSES
STEPHEN R. GALOOB & ERIN SHELEY*
Coercing someone is sometimes wrong and sometimes a crime. People
subject to coercion are sometimes eligible for criminal defenses, such as
duress. How, exactly, does coercion operate in such contexts? Among legal
scholars, the predominant understanding of coercion is the “wrongful
pressure” model, which states that coercion exists when the coercer
wrongfully threatens the target and, as a result of this threat, the target is
pressured to act in accordance with the coercer’s threat.
Some tokens of coercion do not fit neatly within existing legal categories
or the wrongful pressure model of coercion. For example, coercive control
is a psychological phenomenon of interpersonal abuse in which one person
pervasively regulates the choices of another. Coercive control is sometimes
carried out through violence or threats of violence but often through
ostensibly non-violent forms of degradation (such as humiliation and
isolation). Coercive control is often evinced in abusive intimate
relationships, including in human trafficking.
People subject to coercive control are undeniably coerced. Yet the
wrongful pressure model cannot adequately explain why. Those subject to
coercive control are ineligible for coercion-based criminal defenses, such as
duress and affirmative defenses for victims of human trafficking, in part
because of the inadequacy of the wrongful pressure model.
This Article articulates and defends an alternative understanding of
coercion that, after philosopher Scott Anderson’s theory of the same name,
we call the “enforcement approach” to coercion. According to the
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enforcement approach, coercion involves the coercer’s using power to
determine what the target will or will not do. The enforcement approach is
superior to the wrongful pressure approach as an explanation for what
makes coercion wrong and why being subject to coercion should provide a
defense to criminal liability.
Furthermore, the enforcement approach better explains how coercion
operates pervasively, such as in coercive control contexts. The enforcement
approach also invites a broader rethinking of coercion-based criminal
defenses. The enforcement approach grounds a model of criminal defense for
those subject to coercive control that would supplement existing defenses.
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INTRODUCTION
“G.M.” met “D.S.” in 1989 while visiting New York from her
native Dominican Republic.1 Hoping to make enough money to send back to
her children, she stayed in the United States and married D.S. in 1994.2
After they married, D.S. undertook a pattern of physical, emotional, and
financial abuse that led G.M. to return to the Dominican Republic. D.S.
coaxed G.M.’s her return with promises of helping her find work and
changing her immigration status.3 Hoping to provide a better life for her
children, G.M. relented.4
The life she returned to was hell. D.S. beat G.M. so badly that she was
scarred and disfigured.5 D.S. raped G.M. and imprisoned her for weekends
at a time.6 In the words of a New York criminal court, D.S. “exercised
complete control over [G.M.], physically and psychologically,” tracking her
every move and preventing her from leaving the room or the apartment
without him.7 D.S. would drop G.M. off and pick her up from work,
waiting in the car outside to make certain she did not elude him.8 At one
point, G.M. escaped from D.S. and returned to the Dominican Republic with
her children.9 After D.S. tracked her down yet again, he threatened to harm a
close family friend if she did not return to New York.10 According to G.M.,
she “just went back to the nightmare [she] was living. The beatings were
even worse because [D.S.] was angry that [she] went to the Dominican
Republic.”11
G.M. was undeniably wronged and harmed by D.S and by the state’s
failure to intervene in this pattern of abuse. Yet G.M. (rather than D.S.) was
the defendant in the criminal proceedings from which these details arise. At
D.S.’s command, G.M. engaged in illegal activities including sex work and
purchasing crack cocaine for D.S. to minimize his risk of arrest.12 Police
arrested G.M. six times between 1997 and 1998: twice for prostitution, twice
for criminal trespass, and twice for criminal possession of a controlled
1

People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 763.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 762–63.
2
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substance.13 Ultimately, she pleaded guilty to all charges and received “two
non-criminal convictions for disorderly conduct, a violation, and four class
B misdemeanor convictions.”14
G.M. is a survivor of human trafficking, the crime of using force, fraud,
or coercion to lure a victim and force them into either labor or sexual
exploitation.15 G.M.’s case also exemplifies a psychological phenomenon
known as coercive control, “the micro-regulation” of someone’s everyday
behaviors, including the way they dress, perform chores, parent, interact with
friends, or perform sexually.16 Coercive control involves a totalizing
influence of a coercer over the target’s life. It is a form of domination that
arises not only from violence and threats, but also through more indirect
means such as humiliation, isolation, and seizure of physical or financial

13

Id. at 762.
Id.
15
22 U.S.C. § 7102; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
16
See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 5
(2007). Stark’s ground-breaking work on coercive control dealt with female victims of
male domestic abuse, and studies suggest women are more likely than men to be victims
of domestic abuse. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NON-FATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2003-2012 1
(2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXA5-7U
97] (suggesting that seventy-six percent of domestic violence is committed against
women). However, female-on-male domestic abuse occurs as well and may even be
underreported. Rob Whitley, Domestic Violence Against Men: No Laughing Matter,
PSYCH . TODAY (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talkingabout-men/201911/domestic-violence-against-men-no-laughing-matter
[https://perma
.cc/7NY7-7KD3] (collecting international data suggesting that domestic violence against
men is far more widespread than the reported cases suggest). Evidence also indicates that
LGBTQ-identifying people are even more likely to be the victims of domestic violence
than straight-identifying people: the American Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has found that from a sample of 16,000 U.S. adults, 26% of
homosexual men, 37.3% of bisexual men, and 29% of heterosexual men had been a victim
of interpersonal violence, compared to 43.8% of lesbian women, 61.1% of bisexual
women, and 35% of heterosexual women. AM . CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 1–2 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR78-CRAW]. Finally, fiftyfour percent of trans-identifying people report experiencing intimate partner abuse, including
physical harm and coercive control. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF
THE 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 (2016), https://www.trans
equality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/Executive%20Summary%20-%20FINAL%201
.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9H2-89YT]. Thus, while this Article discusses coercive
control in the male-on-female context due to the available sociological literature, our
argument about coercion applies to all coercively controlling relationships regardless of
the genders and sexualities of the parties involved.
14
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resources.17 Human traffickers frequently utilize coercive control to keep
their victims powerless and compliant.18
A broad literature critiques domestic abuse’s status under traditional
criminal law that primarily only covers transactional events like assaults or
threats to commit them as crimes.19 This transactional approach neglects the
programmatic nature of domestic abuse, including its purely psychological
components.20 Scholars pay less attention to the legal situation of those
subject to coercive control who are charged with crimes.
In most U.S. jurisdictions, a defendant in G.M.’s position might have
two possible legal defenses. First, in some jurisdictions, the defendant might
plead an affirmative defense available for those subject to human
trafficking.21 Such laws vary widely, and certain limitations disqualify many
human trafficking survivors. For example, most U.S. jurisdictions limit the
human trafficking affirmative defense to specific crimes, often to crimes
related to sex work.22 Had New York’s current human trafficking affirmative
defense applied at the time of G.M.’s arrests, it would have reached only
G.M.’s two prostitution charges and not her drug possession or trespassing
charges.23 Yet, this result seems anomalous because each of these charges
arose out of the same coercive control scheme.
Another potential defense is duress. At common law, the duress defense
arose where a defendant’s criminal activity was the result of another person’s
unlawful threat to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the defendant or a
third person.24 G.M. faced many threats of bodily harm to herself and her
17
See Vanessa Bettinson, Aligning Partial Defences to Murder with the Offence of
Coercive or Controlling Behaviour, 83 J. CRIM . L. 71, 74 (2019) (summarizing coercive
control as “reflecting extreme examples of accepted male behaviours such as the control
of financial resources; the use of credible threats which may or may not involve threats
of physical violence; a victim feeling in need of the dominator; damaged psychological
well-being of the victim and a high risk of suicide.”).
18
See Michelle Contreras & Melissa Farley, Human Trafficking: Not an Isolated Issue, in
SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A GUIDE TO RECOVERY AND EMPOWERMENT 22, 22 (Thelma
Bryant-Davis ed., 2011).
19
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A
Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 962 (2004).
20
See id. at 972; Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and
Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV . 1107, 1134 (2009).
21
Matthew Myatt, The “Victim-Perpetrator” Dilemma: The Role of State Safe
Harbor Laws in Creating a Presumption of Coercion for Human Trafficking Victims, 25
W M . & M ARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 555, 588–89 (2019).
22
Id. at 590.
23
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 765–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
24
See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV . 1331, 1339 (1988).
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children.25 Yet it is unclear from the opinion in G.M. whether each (or any)
of her charged crimes was a direct response to a specific threat from D.S.
Moreover, G.M. would have needed to show that D.S.’s threatened harm was
imminent and that her fear of that threatened harm was well-grounded in
order to prevail on a duress defense. Some case law denies that threatened
harm is immediate if the defendant has an opportunity to engage in delay
tactics,26 as G.M. conceivably did. For example, D.S.’s threats regarding
G.M.’s children would likely fail to ground a duress defense under this
standard because they were far away in the Dominican Republic and thus
unlikely to have been considered in immediate danger.27 Therefore, the
duress defense would seem inapplicable to G.M.’s case because the
triggering conditions of duress are not realized. Yet the rationale for the
duress defense seems at least as strong in G.M.’s case as in a case of criminal
wrongdoing conducted in acquiescence to a specific, imminent threat.
There are deeper challenges to applying coercion-based defenses such
as duress and human trafficking to cases like G.M.’s. These problems stem
from the notion of coercion that underlies much contemporary thinking about
criminal law. The most prominent understanding of coercion applicable in
criminal law would deny that G.M. was actually coerced by D.S. Call this
predominant view the wrongful pressure approach to coercion.28 On this
approach, coercion exists when a coercer’s threat causes the target to
25

See G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63.
See, e.g., Subramaniam v. Pub. Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965, 972 (PC) (appeal
taken from Malay.).
27
See, e.g., People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 105–06 (Cal. 2004) (finding a trial court’s
refusal to instruct jury on duress defense was proper where threat involved danger to
defendant’s child who was living in another state at the time of the threat).
28
Among legal scholars, Mitchell Berman has been the most prominent expositor of
the “wrongful pressure” view. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of
Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 88 (2002) [hereinafter Berman, Normative
Functions] (“[T]he issue [in defining wrongful] is whether [the coercer] threatens to
violate a normative obligation for the purpose of inducing another to engage in (or
abstain from) a specific action. This is (prima facie) wrongful because it puts wrongful
pressure on [the target’s] freedom to do otherwise.”); Mitchell Berman, Blackmail, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 37, 62 (John Deigh & David
Dolinko eds., 2011) [hereinafter Berman, Blackmail] (“Roughly, coercion is the wrong
of interfering with a person’s freedom by putting improper pressure on his range of
alternatives.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion:
A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX . L. REV . 1283, 1292
(2013) (“To a first approximation, coercion is the wrong of exerting wrongful pressure on
a subject to do as the coercer wishes. And the usual way in which one puts wrongful
pressure on a target’s choices is by threatening to wrong him if he does not comply with
the threatener’s ‘demand’ or ‘condition.’”) (citations omitted). See also infra note 141
(discussing the wrongful pressure model of coercion).
26
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experience psychological pressure and that threat violates the target’s
normative expectations. A coercion-based defense arises only if the coercer’s
threat generates a feeling of pressure in the target sufficient to overbear or
significantly impair the target’s will and the target has a good reason to feel
this pressure as a result of the coercer’s threat. As explained in more detail
below, it is unclear that all (or any) of these conditions would have been
recognized in G.M.’s case.
As G.M.’s case illustrates, the wrongful pressure approach is
problematic as an account of coercion and a basis for coercion-based
defenses.29 This model’s focus on threats and reasonableness is insensitive to
background power dynamics between parties. It also misconstrues the
objectionable features of coercion and fails to capture the phenomenology of
coercion.
Establishing an adequate affirmative defense for coercive control
contexts like G.M.’s case invites reexamination of the wrongful pressure
model of coercion. Recent work challenges the prevailing understanding of
what coercion is, why it is objectionable, and how coercion should bear on
the legal liability of those who are coerced.30 Drawing from this literature,
this Article proposes an alternative model called the enforcement approach
to coercion after philosopher Scott Anderson’s theory of the same name.31
On the enforcement approach, coercion is a function of the coercer using
power to determine what the target will or will not do. The enforcement
approach provides a more plausible understanding of the wrongdoing in
coercive control cases and a clearer explanation for why those subject to
coercive control should be provided a defense against criminal liability. This
approach supports a generalized defense for victims of coercive control that
is broader than the duress defense.
This Article has five substantive parts. Part I describes the phenomenon
of coercive control and applies this concept to human trafficking. Part II
explains the justification for and challenges of tailoring affirmative defenses
to coercive control contexts. Tailoring an affirmative defense for coercive
control contexts raises deeper questions about what coercion is and why
coercion is wrong. Part III identifies the standard “wrongful pressure”
approach to coercion in law and explains why this approach misfires in
coercive control contexts. Part IV articulates and defends an alternative
account of coercion-based defenses built on the enforcement approach. The
29
See discussion infra, Section III(B); Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the
Medicaid Expansion, supra note 28, at 1292.
30
Scott A. Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. ETHICS & SOC.
PHIL. 1, 1–2 (2010).
31
Id. at 1.
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enforcement approach should supplant the wrongful pressure approach as the
predominant way of conceiving of coercion in the realm of criminal defenses.
Part V proposes a model defense for coercive control that should supplement
existing coercion-based defenses.
I. THE COERCIVENESS OF COERCIVE CONTROL: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Coercive control is a distinct form of interpersonal abuse. Part I first
describes the phenomenon and discusses existing and proposed criminal
offenses targeting coercive control, then considers human trafficking as an
example of coercive control.
A. COERCIVE CONTROL DEFINED

Coercive control describes a programmatic form of interpersonal abuse.
According to Professor Evan Stark, “the main means used to establish control
is the micro-regulation of everyday behaviors associated with stereotypical
female roles, such as how women dress, cook, clean, socialize, care for their
children, or perform sexually.”32 Coercive control arises from an ongoing
pattern of interactions intended to establish the controller’s power and
subordination over the victim.33 Although coercive control may include
physical violence or threats of violence, it also involves forms of domination
such as isolation, humiliation, or the control of physical or financial
resources.34
Given this complex dynamic, traditional criminal law tools and defenses
are inadequate responses to coercive control. Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer points out that the “transaction-bound” model of crime—in
which the law treats a criminal action as a discrete, cognizable offense—
misses the reality of domestic abuse as “an ongoing pattern of conduct
occurring within a relationship characterized by power and control.”35 The
harms of coercive control manifest over time as “psychological trauma,
making victims vulnerable as the trauma overrides the ability to control their
lives and experience feelings of helplessness and terror.”36 The physical and
32
See STARK, supra note 16, at 5. While Professor Stark’s work focused specifically
on male-on-female abuse, the ample evidence of interpersonal abuse between all genders
means that our treatment of coercion in this Article is not limited by the genders of the
parties.
33
See, e.g., id. at 4 (collecting the cases Professor Stark encountered in thirty years as an
advocate, counselor, and forensic social worker to conclude that most abuse victims are
compelled to seek help due to patterns of coercive behavior, not domestic violence).
34
See Bettinson, supra note 17, at 74.
35
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 960–61, 972.
36
Bettinson, supra note 17, at 73.
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psychological abuse involved in coercive control not only harms the victim
but also correlates with a myriad of psychological as well as physiological
effects such as arthritis, chronic pain, migraine and other frequent headaches,
stammering, sexually-transmitted infections, and chronic pelvic pain.37
Those subject to coercive control suffer from the loss of personal
autonomy that is comparable to the harms imposed by kidnapping.38
According to Professor Stark, coercive control involves conduct intended to
undermine another person’s autonomy, freedom, and integrity.39 Professors
Vanessa Bettinson and Charlotte Bishop state that “[w]hereas many criminal
offenses protect individuals against ‘the reduction of options,’ domestic
abuse involves not only the options of the victim being reduced, but also the
options that remain being subject to unwarranted and arbitrary control by
another person.”40 The aim of even non-violent coercive control is for an
abuser indefinitely to dictate all aspects of the coercively controlled person’s
life.41 The presence of coercive control also predicts more serious physical
violence. A National Institute for Justice study found that partners who
exercised control over their partner’s daily activities were more than five
times more likely eventually to kill them.42
37

Ann L. Coker, Paige H. Smith, Lesa Bethea, Melissa R. King & Robert E.
McKeown, Physical Health Consequences of Physical and Psychological Intimate
Partner Violence, 9 ARCHIVES FAM . M ED . 451, 456 (2000) (“We found that psychological
violence was associated with many of the same health outcomes as was physical IPV”).
Victims of coercive control are also at a greater risk of suicide. See RUTH AITKEN &
VANESSA E. M UNRO , DOMESTIC ABUSE AND SUICIDE: EXPLORING THE LINKS WITH
REFUGE’S CLIENT BASE AND W ORK FORCE 11 (2018), http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103609/
[https://perma.cc/RCW4-YRWR].
38
See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s
Coercive Control into Legal Doctrine for Abused Women, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST W OMEN
1458, 1460 (2009).
39
See STARK , supra note 16, at 389–90.
40
Vanessa Bettinson & Charlotte Bishop, Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of
Coercive Control Necessary to Combat Domestic Violence?, 66 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 179, 183
(2015).
41
See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 743 (2005); Tamara L. Kuennen,
Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much is Too
Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 10 (2007); Victor Tadros, The
Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account, 65 LA . L. REV . 989, 999
(2004); Donald G. Dutton & Sally Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive
Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Through Theory, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
105, 107 (1993).
42
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn R. Block,
Doris Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs, Phyllis
Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich & Susan A. Wilt, Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner
Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 14, 17 (2003). See also Neil Websdale, Assessing
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B. COERCIVE CONTROL AS CRIMINAL OFFENSE

Coercive control is not a crime in any U.S. jurisdiction, although it has
been criminalized in England, France, Scotland, and Ireland.43 The U.K.’s
passage of Serious Crime Act 2015 § 76 criminalizes coercive or controlling
behavior in an intimate or family relationship.44 Section 76 states:
(1)

A person (A) commits an offence if—

a.
A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviortowards another person (B)
that is controlling or coercive,
b.

At the time of the behavior, A and B arepersonally connected,

c.

The behavior has a serious effect on B, and

d.

A knows or ought to know that the behavior will have a serious effect on B45

If adopted in the United States, this statute would likely violate due
process on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.46 Previously, one of us has
proposed a statutory approach to criminalizing coercive control would avoid
such problems by modeling the extant structure of criminal fraud, which
focuses on the scienter of the defendant rather than the effects on the victim.47
On this proposal, a person would be guilty of criminal coercive control if
they:

Risk in Domestic Violence Cases, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 38, 40 (Nicky
Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (citing “obsessive possessiveness or morbid jealousy” as a factor
“the research literature consistently identifies . . . as central to intimate partner
homicide”); Signs of Abuse, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/signs-of-abuse [https://perma.cc/T53L-TM77] (identifying numerous
non-violent controlling behaviors as “warning signs” of violence).
43
Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2015/9/section/76 [https://perma.cc/RBP9-TJ5A]; Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act
2018, (ASP 5) § 1, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2018/5/contents [https://perma
.cc/Y4VX-9QMA]; Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Act No. 6/2018) (Ir.), https://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/6/enacted/en/html?q=domestic+violence+act+&ye
ars=2018 [https://perma.cc/K37F-XXA7]; Loi 2010-769 du 9 juillet 2010 relative aux
violences faites spécifiquement aux femmes, aux violences au sein des couples et aux
incidences de ces dernières sur les enfants [Law 2010-769 of July 9, 2010, on Violence
Against Women, Violence Between Spouses, and the Effects of These Types of Violence
on Children], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE ], July 10, 2010, p. 0158.
44
Serious Crime Act, supra note 43.
45
Id.
46
Erin Sheley, Criminalizing Coercive Control Within the Limits of Due Process, 70
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1338–41 (2021).
47
Id. at 1379.
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a.) Continuously engage in a coercive pattern of behavior over a substantial period of
time with the intent to deprive another person of their autonomy to make decisions and
engage in conduct to which they otherwise have the right; and
b.) The two parties are spouses, intimate partners, or family members; and
c.) The pattern of behavior causes or creates a risk of non-trivial economic, physical,
mental, or emotional harm to the coerced party.48

The requirement of a pattern of behavior is intentionally broad because
coercive control—and domestic abuse generally—is diachronic (i.e.,
extended in time) rather than “transaction-bound.”49 Furthermore, the
requirement of a “pattern” functions similarly to the requirement of an
“agreement” in the offense of criminal conspiracy: it transforms otherwise
legal behavior (an isolated controlling act in the one and an individual’s
private thought of committing a crime in the other) into a cognizable
offense.50
In the G.M. case, for example, D.S.’s conduct would easily constitute a
pattern of behavior. From at least 1994 until 2005, D.S. engaged in a series
of related acts, both legal (picking G.M. up from work, flying to the
Dominican Republic to beg her to return) and illegal (imprisonment, rape,
and assault).51 The “intent to deprive” element of the proposed statute is
equivalent to the “intent to defraud” element of criminal fraud: a purpose of
using coercive behavior to extract unearned obedience from his victim in
exchange for nothing but more threats.52 For example, G.M. testified that,
after she made her most significant assertion of self-will, “the beatings were
even worse because D.S. was angry that I went to the Dominican
Republic.”53 D.S.’s pattern of behavior supports the inference that D.S.
intended to commandeer G.M.’s authority to decide what to do for herself.
C. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AS COERCIVE CONTROL

Human traffickers use force, fraud, or coercion to force a target into
either labor or sexual exploitation.54 Human traffickers routinely engage in
psychological and physical abuse, including coercive control, in order to
elicit cooperation from their victims. For example, in addition to violence
and threats of violence, traffickers may also assert economic and legal
48

Id. at 1386.
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 972.
50
Sheley, supra note 46, at 1387.
51
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 761–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
52
Sheley, supra note 46, at 1389.
53
G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
54
See 22 U.S.C. § 7102; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
49
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pressures premised on the illegality of sex work.55 Human traffickers identify
targets based on personal or social characteristics such as psychological or
emotional vulnerability, economic hardship, lack of a social safety net, and
experience of natural disasters or political instability.56 Furthermore,
traffickers often isolate victims, induce exhaustion, and interfere with their
perceived or real ability to escape.57 These forms of abuse result in long-term
psychological trauma,58 often so significant that victims fear revealing
themselves or asking for help.59 Instead, the interaction between a trafficking
victim and a trafficker can result in “trauma bonding,” in which the target
perceives a threat to their physical and psychological survival at the hands of
their trafficker.60
Trauma bonding exemplifies the pattern of interactions in coercively
controlling relationships from which the abused party feels helpless to
escape.61 A trafficked person may eventually feel helpless and respond to any
ostensible show of “help” or “kindness” from their trafficker with gratitude
and attachment in order to survive.62 A trafficked person’s social and
economic circumstances, including lack of housing and employment, may
also contribute to the trafficked person’s sense of trust and loyalty toward a
trafficker and thus increase the likelihood of trauma bonding.63
The G.M. case exemplifies human trafficking. G.M. entered the United
States on a tourist visa and began her relationship with D.S. voluntarily.51
However, over time D.S. forced G.M. to engage in commercial sex work and
make other efforts to sustain his substance abuse disorder.52 This pattern
qualifies as a form of “severe trafficking in persons” under U.S. law.53 While
human trafficking is often associated with the transportation of victims across
55

Michelle Contreras & Melissa Farley, Human Trafficking: Not an Isolated Issue, in
SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE : A GUIDE TO RECOVERY AND EMPOWERMENT 2 2 (Thelma
Bryant-Davis ed., 2011).
56
What is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/KLM8-2CNH].
57
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 10 (20th ed. 2020).
58
See Christine Stark & Carol Hodgson, Sister Oppressions: A Comparison of Wife
Battering and Prostitution, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 17, 25 (2004); Melissa Ugarte, Laura
Zarate & Michelle Farley, Prostitution and Trafficking of Women and Children from
Mexico to the United States, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 147, 158 (2004).
59
What is Human Trafficking?, supra note 56.
60
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 57, at 20.
61
See Sherry Gaba, Trauma Bonding, Codependency, and Narcissistic Abuse, PSYCH .
TODAY (May 29, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/addiction-andrecovery/201905/trauma-bonding-codependency-and-narcissistic-abuse [https://perma
.cc/DQ87-XGKS].
62
Id.
63
Id.
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international lines, G.M.’s case shows that trafficking can also occur intranationally.
Human trafficking has attracted widespread bipartisan concern.64 The
federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was signed into law by
President Clinton and carried on by Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump.65
All fifty states now have parallel legislation that criminally prohibits human
trafficking.66 Some state law definitions of the human trafficking offense are
so broad as to encompass nearly all commercial sex, while others include
conduct that would otherwise be classified as domestic violence or sexual
assault.67 Despite the consensus around the objectionableness of human
trafficking, there is no consensus about the best definition of the offense and
who should be classified as human trafficking victims.68 Some feminist
scholars have argued that all sex workers should qualify as victims of human
trafficking,69 while others argue for a more limited human trafficking
definition which excludes more consensual or autonomous forms of sex
work.70 Disagreements about whether someone has in fact been subjected to
“force,” “fraud,” or “coercion” can make the difference between legal
recognition of them as a victim or perpetrator of human trafficking.71

64
See Julie Dahlstrom, The Elastic Meaning(s) of Human Trafficking, 108 CALIF. L.
REV . 379, 388 (2020).
65
Id.
66
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 57, at 20.
67
Dahlstrom, supra note 64, at 415–20.
68
Id. at 391–92. See also Dina Francesca Haynes, The Celebritization of Human
Trafficking, 653 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 30 (2014) (“There
are . . . conflicting viewpoints about many aspects of human trafficking. There are
disagreements as to the extent of the problem, the definition of trafficking, who the
victims are, how best to support them, and how to combat trafficking more generally.
Statistical data on human trafficking are wildly inconsistent and lack rigorous empirical
support.”).
69
See Janie Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking
Law, 108 AM . J. INT’L L. 610, 615 (2014).
70
See P RABHA K OTISWARAN , D ANGEROUS S EX , I NVISIBLE L ABOR : S EX W ORK AND
THE L AW IN I NDIA 10 (2011). In a survey of state anti-trafficking enforcement, Professor
Jennifer Chacón found that in states such as Texas, Georgia, and Arizona, where the political
rhetoric behind anti-trafficking legislation turns on immigration control, non-citizen
trafficking victims were afraid of the anti-immigrant state laws and law enforcement generally
and therefore did not seek help “even as narratives of their victimization have been used to
justify increased funding and focus on antitrafficking initiatives.” Jennifer M. Chacón,
Human Trafficking, Immigration Regulation, and Sub-federal Criminalization, 20 N EW
CRIM . L. REV . 96, 128 (2017).
71
Michelle Madden Dempsey, Decriminalizing Victims of Sex Trafficking, 52 AM .
CRIM . L. REV . 207, 215 (2015).
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Whatever its formal definition, human trafficking is only one context in
which abusers rely on coercive control. As trends in the U.K. and Europe
toward criminalization demonstrate, coercive control is a pervasive social
problem affecting women and others in a range of interpersonal contexts,
including the domestic. The next Part will turn to a secondary problem arising
from coercive control: those subject to coercive control who commit criminal
offenses while under the control of an abuser.
II. COERCIVE CONTROL AND COERCION-BASED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Those who are trafficked to perform sex work exist in a nebulous state
of quasi-criminality due to the illegality of sex work and the tendency of sex
work to accompany other criminal offenses. This plight points to a broader
conceptual problem with appraising the legal liability of those who commit
crimes while subject to coercive control. This Part considers two possible
legal defenses available to victims of coercive control who commit crimes:
duress and human trafficking affirmative defenses. Section A contends that
the duress defense, as canonically formulated, is inadequate to address
human trafficking cases such as G.M.’s. Section B argues that the vast
majority of human trafficking affirmative defenses are inadequate for similar
reasons. Both of these inadequacies stem from the basic notion of coercion
that underlies coercion-based defenses.
A. DURESS AND COERCIVE CONTROL

Someone who commits crimes while being coercively controlled might
plead duress as a defense to criminal liability. Yet, the duress defense as
canonically formulated in U.S. law systematically misfires in coercive
control contexts.
The duress defense has been subject to a number of formulations, not
all of which are consistent with each other.72 We stipulate the following
definition of duress:
72
See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 24, at 1335 (“D will be acquitted of an offense other
than murder on the basis of duress if he pleads and proves that: (1) C unlawfully
threatened imminently to kill or grievously injure him or another person; and (2) he was
not at fault in exposing himself to the threat.”); 1 W AYNE R. LA FAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7 (3d ed. 2020) (“A person’s unlawful threat (1) which causes the
defendant reasonably to believe that the only way to avoid imminent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or to another is to engage in conduct which violates the literal
terms of the criminal law, and (2) which causes the defendant to engage in that conduct,
gives the defendant the defense of duress (sometimes called compulsion or coercion) to
the crime in question unless that crime consists of intentionally killing an innocent third
person.”); Claire O. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law,
37 ARIZ. L. REV . 251, 254 (1995) (“The core requirements for claiming the defense are
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Canonical duress: the target of coercion has a defense against criminal
liability for acting in a particular way (X’ing) if and only if:
(1) target believes for a good reason that the coercer will act in a certain
way (Y’ing) that would set back significant interests of target or another
person unless target X’s (the “coercion model”);
(2) the coercion referenced in (1) arises from coercer’s threat of Y’ing
(the “nexus requirement”)73;
(3) the harm referenced in coercer’s threat of Y’ing is sufficiently
immediate (the “immediacy requirement”);
(4) target has no reasonable way of avoiding the harm referenced in
coercer’s threat of Y’ing except through X’ing (the “necessity
requirement”);
(5) X’ing is not the crime of murder (the “offense restriction”)74;
(6) target is not responsible for creating the conditions under which
coercer’s threat of Y’ing arises (the “actio libera restriction”)75
generally accepted as the following: (1) The defendant must have no reasonable
opportunity to escape from the coercive situation. (2) The defendant must be threatened
with significant harm-death or serious bodily injury. (3) The threatened harm must be
illegal. (4) The threat must be of imminent harm. (5) The defendant must not have placed
herself voluntarily in a situation in which she could expect to be subject to coercion, as is
the case when a person joins a violent criminal organization. The two requirements which
appear to have marginal status are as follows: (6) Duress must not be pleaded as a defense
to murder. (7) The defendant must have been acting on a specific command from the
coercer.”).
73
See, e.g., Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A
Justification, Not an Excuse—and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM . L. REV . 833, 847 (2003)
(“[D]uress is defined as either consisting of or including threats that are purposefully
coercive . . . . This . . . feature is significant because purposefully coercive threats do
more than bring pressure to bear upon bystanders. They also dictate to bystanders what
their aggressors exact as exclusive avenues of escape.”).
74
See, e.g., Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense’s Uncharted Terrain: Applying it
to Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV .
159, 174 (2006); Joshua Dressler, Duress, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 269, 270 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011) (noting that the
“traditional duress defense” is “unavailable in murder prosecutions”) (citations omitted).
75
Susan Dimock, Actio Libera in Causa, 7 CRIM . L. & PHIL. 549, 552 (2013) (noting
that the actio libera in causa doctrine states that “defendants should not be able to rely
upon defences, the conditions of which they have culpably created”); Vera Bergelson,
Duress Is No Excuse, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 395, 404 (2017) (“Duress requires “clean
hands,” namely, the lack of the subjective fault on the part of the actor in finding himself
in the coercive situation.”); Dressler, supra note 24, at 1341 (“[D]uress probably may not
be pleaded by one who is at fault for placing himself in the coercive situation.”) (citations
omitted); M ODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (AM . L. INST. 1985) (“The defense [of lesser
evils] . . . is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it
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Conditions (2)–(6) are the triggering conditions of duress—that is, the
conditions in addition to the existence of coercion that must be satisfied in
order for a defendant to be eligible to assert a duress defense. Most legal
theorizing about duress posits a principled connection between the defense’s
triggering conditions and its underlying model of coercion. For example,
Professor Claire Finkelstein posits a normative theory of duress as available
for conduct that constitutes “the best course of action under the
circumstances.”76 In light of this theory, Professor Finkelstein argues that the
necessity and immediacy requirements and the actio libera restriction of
duress can “be explained as features of the situation that bear on whether the
actor’s behavior was understandable under the circumstances.”77 Likewise,
Professor Joshua Dressler posits that a successful defense of duress is
premised on the normative conclusion that the target of coercion “lacked a
fair opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully.”78 On Professor Dressler’s
argument, the triggering conditions of the defense (such as the requirement
of an unlawful threat to imminently cause death or grievous bodily harm to
the defendant or some third person)79 and the target’s lack of fault for being
in a coercive situation80 serve to establish that the coerced actor has “attained
or reflected society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength.”81 On both
of these theories, an account of how coercion works helps to explain and is,
in turn, explained by the conditions under which the duress defense may be
asserted. Triggering conditions, then, make sense only in light of an
underlying model of coercion.
To illustrate the connection between the model of coercion and the
triggering conditions, consider a “textbook case”82 of duress, State v.
Toscano.83 Joseph Toscano, a chiropractor, owed a gambling debt to Richard
Leonardo, a gangster.84 Richard’s brother William contacted Toscano and
asked for “a favor,” namely, that Toscano create a fraudulent injury report
was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he
was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to
establish culpability for the offense charged.”).
76
See Finkelstein, supra note 72, at 271.
77
Id. at 272.
78
Dressler, supra note 24, at 1365.
79
Id. at 1339.
80
Id. at 1341.
81
Id. at 1334.
82
Kyron Huigens, Duress is Not a Justification, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 303, 304
(2004).
83
378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977).
84
Id. at 758.
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for a confederate of William’s that would be submitted to an insurer.85
“You’re going to make this bill out for me,” William Leonardo told
Toscano.86 “Remember, you just moved into a place that has a very dark
entrance and you [live] there with your wife . . . . You and your wife are
going to jump at shadows when you leave that dark entrance.”87 Toscano
signed the fraudulent report and was later indicted for conspiracy and a host
of other crimes related to William Leonardo’s scheme.88 The trial court
precluded Toscano from arguing a duress defense on the grounds that
William Leonardo’s statement to Toscano could not constitute a “‘present,
imminent and impending’ threat of harm.”89 On appeal, the court reversed
Toscano’s conviction because it found that Leonardo’s alleged statement
sufficed to satisfy Toscano’s burden of production to raise the duress
defense.90
Toscano exemplifies each aspect of canonical duress. The Toscano
court posits a specific model of coercion in its finding that Toscano was
eligible to assert the defense if and only if William Leonardo’s threat of
harming Toscano or his wife induced in Toscano a “reasonable fear”91 that
Leonardo would bring about such harm. (In the terminology introduced
below,92 the Toscano court thereby utilizes the “wrongful pressure” model of
coercion.) The Toscano court also applies an implicit nexus requirement:
Toscano is required to establish that any experience of coercion arose out of
William Leonardo’s threat, rather than a more general menace arising out of
Leonardo’s reputation as a gangster.93 Much of the analysis in the Toscano
opinion concerns the articulation of the immediacy requirement—
specifically whether immediacy could be judged as a matter of law from an
“objective” perspective or whether immediacy is a question of fact that must
be relativized to the defendant’s circumstances.94 This reasonableness
inquiry also informs the Toscano court’s articulation of the necessity
requirement: Toscano’s capitulation to William Leonardo’s proposal would
85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 759.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 765.
92
See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
93
Toscano, 378 A.2d at 761 (“A ‘generalized fear of retaliation’ by an accomplice,
unrelated to any specific threat, is also insufficient.”) (citations omitted).
94
The Toscano court, following the Model Penal Code, articulates immediacy in
terms of whether a “person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant’s] situation” would
have been “unable to resist” the threatener’s threat. Id. at 765.
86
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not ground a duress defense if the jury found that Toscano neglected other,
non-criminal responses, such as reporting Leonardo’s threat and scheme to
the police.95 The court in Toscano acknowledges the offense restriction by
delimiting duress to crimes “other than murder.”96 It implicitly acknowledges
the actio libera restriction by noting that the duress defense might not be
available if Toscano’s capitulation was motivated by a desire to satisfy his
gambling debts to Richard Leonardo rather than out of “fear[] for his wife’s
and his own bodily safety.”97
However well-suited it is in cases of transactional coercion such as
Toscano, the duress defense is ill-suited to apply in coercive control contexts
for several reasons. First, the nexus requirement is inappropriate because
coercive control often does not involve specific threats. The logic of coercive
control is that the coercer creates an environment in which the target is
subject to pervasive coercion.98 In many coercive control contexts, specific
threats by the coercer become unnecessary because the target has internalized
and anticipates the coercer’s commands and desires.99
For example, although the G.M. opinion references numerous threats by
D.S. toward G.M,100 the opinion does not tie specific threats by D.S. to
distinct criminal offenses by G.M. Doing so would adopt what Professor
Tuerkheimer calls the “transaction-bound model” of crime101 and would
understate the insidiousness of the pervasive and temporally-extended
coercion to which D.S. subjected G.M. The coercion applied to G.M. was not
simply the function of each of the discrete transactions in which G.M.’s
autonomy was disrupted by D.S.’s conditional proposals (e.g., “Obtain the
drugs on this occasion or else I will beat you again”). Rather, the coercive
controller’s pattern of isolation and abuse creates an environment in which
such a proposal is unnecessary because the target has already anticipated the
harsh treatment from the coercer and incorporated the coercer’s wishes into
their practical deliberations. Thus, the strength of G.M.’s defense against
criminal liability should not depend on tying specific criminal activity by
G.M. to a specific threat by D.S.
Second, the immediacy requirement is inapt in coercive control
contexts. There is a debate about whether immediacy should be assessed
subjectively from the standpoint of the target, objectively from the standpoint
95

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 757.
98
See, e.g., MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS 141 (2003).
99
See, e.g., People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
100
Id.
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See Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 972.
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of the reasonable person, or under a mixed set of objective and subjective
criteria.102 Yet, regardless of how immediacy is formulated, the requirement
is insensitive to the prospect that a coercive controller can alter a target’s
environment such that the target construes possible harm as omnipresent. The
coercively controlled person’s altered sense of immediacy can be the product
of deliberate efforts by the coercer.103 For example, a study by the Polaris
Project found that fifteen percent of trafficking victims surveyed had their
drug use exploited or induced by their traffickers, in some cases to the point
of being recruited directly out of rehab centers.104 A substance abuse disorder
can alter a target’s understanding of what is possible due to physically
changing the areas of the brain responsible for judgment, decision-making,
learning, memory, and behavior control.105 Likewise, in G.M., the court
recounts that D.S. threatened to harm G.M.’s children in the Dominican
Republic if she did not perform criminal activities in New York.106 Such
remote threats would almost certainly fail to satisfy the imminence
requirement of common law duress107 and would likely fail under the looser
“person of reasonable firmness” standard of the Model Penal Code.108 Yet
D.S.’s systematic abuse and deprivation of G.M. might well have obviated
the distinction between immediate and non-immediate reaches of D.S.’s
power. The immediacy requirement, then, malfunctions when the target’s
perceptions of possibility distorted by the efforts of the coercer.
102

See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 75, at 405 (“Duress . . . is largely based on an
objective standard. Naturally, to be able to claim duress, the defendant has to feel
threatened. But even this subjective element is severely curtailed by the limitation placed
on the kind of threat that may be claimed as the cause of this feeling: the threat has to be
of physical harm to a person.”); Finkelstein, supra note 72, at 266 (“Both the academic
literature on duress and the statutory codifications of the defense contain expressions
of . . . [a] rationale . . . that is subjective or psychological: an individual who performs an
action out of fear for his life may lack the ability to conform his behavior to the law.”).
103
POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2019),
https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Human-Trafficking-and-theOpioid-Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCX7-FLL8].
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Joanna S. Fowler, Nora D. Volkow, Cheryl A. Kassed & Linda Chang,
Imaging the Addicted Human Brain, 3 SCI. PRACT. PERSP. 4, 4–16 (2007).
106
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
107
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 298 (6th ed. 2012)
(detailing that the common law formulation of duress requires that “deadly force
threatened must be imminent,” which requires that “the threatened harm will occur
immediately, unless the actor complies”).
108
See M ODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 explanatory note (AM . L. INST. 1985) (“[T]he
defense [of duress] is not established simply by the fact that the defendant was coerced;
he must have been coerced in circumstances under which a personal of reasonable
firmness in his situation would likewise have been unable to resist”).
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Third, the necessity requirement is unjustified in coercive control
contexts. The necessity requirement asks whether the target had options for
evading the coercer’s threatened harm other than engaging in criminally
prohibited activity. However, the standard way of assessing the target’s
options implicitly involves a synchronic assessment of the target’s options—
that is, an assessment of the target’s options at the time of the proposal in
isolation from historical context and futurity. Yet coercive control implicates
a diachronic impact of the coercer on the target.
Histories of interaction between the coercer and the target may distort
the target’s understanding of their options at present and into the future. In
many such cases, a target perceives objectively viable options (e.g., leaving
the abuser, seeking help from government service providers) as unavailable
at a particular moment because of efforts by the coercer to influence the
target’s appraisal of those options.109 Such distortions evince coercion. Yet,
under the necessity requirement, they would disqualify the coercively
controlled person from asserting a duress defense.
Thus, the canonical notion of duress is suitable to analyzing cases like
Toscano but unsuitable to analyzing coercive control cases like G.M. The
former realizes the triggering conditions of duress, while the latter do not.
This asymmetry is troubling regardless of one’s ultimate conclusion about
the legal significance of coercive control. The coercion in G.M. seems at least
as objectionable (and at least as strong a basis for a defense) as the coercion
in Toscano. The difference in the legal status of these cases is an artifact of
the triggering conditions of canonical duress. This asymmetry is especially
objectionable where the deliberate, sustained efforts of the coercer make it
the case that the triggering conditions of duress are not satisfied.
B. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Perhaps the difficulties raised by the asymmetrical treatment of cases
like Toscano and G.M. can be resolved by applying a more fine-grained
alternative to duress, such as the human trafficking affirmative defense
recognized in many U.S. jurisdictions.110 Human trafficking affirmative
defenses typically relax the triggering conditions of duress and expand the
offense restriction by broadening the range of offenses for which an
affirmative defense is inapplicable.111 Under the typical state human
trafficking affirmative defense, the defendant bears at least the burden of
109

See Chacón, supra note 70, at 128.
Meghan Hilborn, How Oklahoma’s Human Trafficking Victim Defense Is Poised
to Be the Boldest Stand Against Human Trafficking in the Country, 54 TULSA L. REV . 457,
463–64 (2018).
111
Id. at 475–76.
110
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production for establishing their status as a victim of human trafficking.112
Once established, the defendant may plead an affirmative defense without
establishing that the trafficker specifically threatened them regarding the
commission of a specific crime, that this threat was processed as immediate,
and that the only way for the defendant to avoid the trafficker’s coercion was
to commit the crime (each of which are prerequisites to asserting canonical
duress).113
Most affirmative defenses for human trafficking are more tightly
constrained than the duress defense. Recall that canonical duress is
categorically precluded for those charged with homicide, although even this
restriction is contested.114 By contrast, most human trafficking affirmative
defenses are inapplicable for a broader range of criminal offenses. A recent
survey of state human trafficking affirmative defense statutes found that
[o]ut of the thirty-seven states that afford victims an affirmative defense, over seventy
percent only allow a victim to raise the defense to a charge of prostitution or
prostitution-related offenses. Comparatively, Colorado, Mississippi, and New Jersey
only allow the affirmative defense to a charge of human trafficking, presumably
protecting the ‘bottom girl.’ Only five states, around thirteen percent, lack a crime
115
limitation in [their] affirmative defense[s].

Several human trafficking affirmative defenses in U.S. jurisdictions also
impose a nexus requirement—that is, an “element of the defense that would
connect the victim’s alleged criminal act to the human trafficking.”116 While
the nexus requirement of duress requires that the target’s criminally
prohibited action be the product of coercion experienced by the target as a
response to the coercer’s threat, the nexus requirement in most human
trafficking affirmative defenses allows for a looser connection between the
coercive situation and criminally prohibited action.117 For example,
112

See, e.g., In re M.D., 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 761, 767–68 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding that
the juvenile court properly assigned the burden of proof on a minor charged with intent
to commit prostitution to establish that she was a victim of human trafficking under
California’s human trafficking affirmative defense statute); State ex rel M.J., 160 So. 3d
1040, 1053 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that the state had no burden to prove that
defendant in delinquency proceedings was not a victim of sex trafficking under Louisiana
law).
113
See Hilborn, supra note 110, at 470.
114
See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 107, at 287–88 (summarizing debates over
whether duress should be a defense to murder).
115
See Hilborn, supra note 110, at 476 (citations omitted).
116
Id. at 471; see also id. at 476 (“Nearly half of the thirty-seven states with [human
trafficking] affirmative defenses create a tight nexus between the victim’s conduct and
the fact that the victim was trafficked by utilizing language ‘as a result of’ or ‘as a direct
result of.’”) (citations omitted).
117
Id. at 477.
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Wyoming’s human trafficking affirmative defense states that the criminal act
for which the affirmative defense is sought must be committed “as a direct
result of, or incident to, being a victim of human trafficking.”118
Consider how the offense restriction and nexus requirement might
operate in G.M. According to the opinion, D.S. coerced G.M. to perform
commercial sex acts.119 New York’s vacatur statute allows human trafficking
victims to vacate convictions for prostitution-related offenses—specifically
prostitution and loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution-related
offense—if the charges were “the result of” a defendant’s “having been a
victim of sex trafficking” under New York law.120 G.M.’s trespassing charges
presumably arose as part of engaging in commercial sex work, although the
opinion does not explicitly say so. These charges would arguably satisfy both
the offense restriction and the nexus requirement because they directly arose
from D.S.’s coercion of G.M. to engage in sex work. Yet, as the court in G.M.
noted, D.S. also forced G.M. to buy drugs for him “because D.S. feared
getting arrested himself.”121 It is not clear that these drug charges were the
result of D.S.’s trafficking of G.M. To be sure, the G.M. opinion references
such a connection based on a presumption in New York’s vacatur statute
“that [a] defendant’s participation in [offenses other than commercial sex
work] was a result of having been a victim of sex trafficking or trafficking in
persons.”122 Yet the prosecutors in G.M. contended that only G.M.’s
prostitution-related crimes were directly connected to human trafficking.123
Indeed, a prosecutor could argue that D.S. forced G.M. to participate in two
separate schemes, one involving procuring drug money through sex work and
the other involving acquiring drugs. However, because the second scheme
existed independently of the first, it is plausible that G.M.’s acquisition of
drugs did not satisfy the nexus requirement. Nevertheless, G.M.’s offenses
do not satisfy the statutory offense restriction. Therefore, G.M. would fail to
118
Id. at 476; see also W IS. STAT. § 939.46(1m) (LEXIS through Act 188 of 2021–22
Legis. Sess.) (“A victim [of human trafficking] has an affirmative defense for any offense
committed as a direct result of the violation of [Wisconsin’s criminal prohibition on
human trafficking].”).
119
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 765 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he defendant has
provided a very compelling narrative of the circumstances surrounding all of her arrests,
demonstrating that they were the product of years of brutal physical, psychological and
sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in having been trafficked by him.”).
120
See N.Y. CRIM . PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2021,
Ch. 833).
121
922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63.
122
Id. at 765 (citing N.Y. CRIM . PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2010)).
123
Id. at 764 (“The People are exercising discretion in this particular case, the People
are not looking to expand the [vacatur] statute. The defendant was convicted of four
crimes and two violations, only two of the crimes are covered by [the vacatur] statute.”).
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satisfy the then-applicable version of New York’s human trafficking
affirmative defense regarding at least some (and perhaps all) of her charged
offenses.
Among U.S. states, only Oklahoma’s human trafficking statute arguably
imposes neither an offense restriction nor a nexus requirement.124
Oklahoma’s statute provides “an affirmative defense to prosecution for a
criminal offense that, during the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, the defendant was a victim of human trafficking.”125 The statute’s
text also contains no offense restriction, so it applies to prosecutions for any
criminal offense. Without a nexus requirement, once the defendant’s status
as a victim of human trafficking has been established, there is no further
inquiry into whether any crime committed was the “direct result” of human
trafficking. Oklahoma’s statute also creates distinct procedural rights for
victims of human trafficking, including that they are “[n]ot to be jailed, fined,
or otherwise penalized due to having been trafficked,”126 that they must
receive “prompt medical care, mental health care, food, and other assistance,
as necessary,”127 and that they may bring a civil action against anyone who
engaged in the human trafficking.128
Under Oklahoma’s affirmative defense, G.M. would have been entitled
to a defense against criminal liability for any crime that occurred “during the
time that” she was a victim of human trafficking,129 rather than merely those
criminal charges related to sex work. Upon establishing that G.M. had been
forced into engaging in commercial sex, she would have been classified as a
124
See Hilborn, supra note 111, at 475–76 (“Based on a survey of states’ humantrafficking statutes, Oklahoma’s is the most expansive in the nation [because] Oklahoma
is the only state that lacks both a crime limitation and a nexus requirement.”) (emphasis
omitted). To be sure, this interpretation of Oklahoma’s human trafficking affirmative
defense described here has not been definitively recognized by any Oklahoma court,
although the legal parameters of the affirmative defense have been incorporated into
Oklahoma’s model criminal jury instructions. See OKLA. CT. OF CRIM. APP., OKLAHOMA
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 8-61 (2d ed. 2017) (“The defendant has raised the
defense that he/she was a victim of human trafficking during the time of the alleged
offense. It is the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was not a victim of human trafficking during the time of the alleged offense. If you find
that the state has failed to satisfy its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
defendant must be found not guilty.”). That said, there are no reported cases of defendants
applying or interpreting this statute. Therefore, despite the plain implications of
Oklahoma’s statute, it is possible that Oklahoma courts do not actually adopt the
interpretation of the Oklahoma human trafficking affirmative defense offered here.
125
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 58th Leg. (2021)).
126
Id. § 748.2(A)(3).
127
Id. § 748.2(A)(4).
128
Id. § 748.2(B).
129
Id. § 748(D); OKLA. CT. OF CRIM. APP., supra note 124.
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“victim of human trafficking”130 and would have been entitled to a suite of
procedural rights not afforded to other criminal defendants.131
Oklahoma’s human trafficking affirmative defense is the best existing
legal recognition of the scope and nature of human control and its
relationship to a victim’s criminal behavior. Other states could and should
benefit from this example and expand their own human trafficking statutes
similarly. Nonetheless, human trafficking statutes are, by definition, contextspecific. The criminal law should, ideally, embody a consistent account of
coercion as a defense to criminal liability.
The duress defense misfires in coercive control contexts. Coercive
control scenarios do not realize the triggering conditions of canonical duress.
Yet many coercive control cases involve at least as objectionable forms of
coercion as do cases in which duress is available. The triggering conditions
of duress cannot easily be modified without raising questions about the
notion of coercion that underlies the duress defense. Human trafficking
affirmative defenses more plausibly apply to coercive control contexts. Such
defenses relax some of the triggering conditions of canonical duress while
tightening others. Yet defending the nexus requirements and offense
restrictions in most human trafficking statutes also implicates fundamental
questions about coercion. Therefore, justifying an affirmative defense for
those subject to coercive control requires examining and perhaps rethinking
the basic understanding of coercion that underlies coercion-based criminal
defenses. The next two Parts undertake these tasks.
III. COERCION-BASED DEFENSES AND THE WRONGFUL PRESSURE
APPROACH TO COERCION
This Part first describes the wrongful pressure approach to coercion, the
predominant way of understanding coercion in U.S. law, then identifies
several problems with the wrongful pressure approach that motivate the
alternative account discussed in Part IV.
A. THE WRONGFUL PRESSURE APPROACH TO COERCION

Aside from duress, coercion arises in a variety of legal domains. For
example, coercion might vitiate consent in a contract negotiation.132 Federal
130

§ 748(D).
In particular, the right to be “housed in an appropriate shelter as soon as
practicable” OKLA . STAT. tit. 21, § 748.2(A)(1) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 58th
Leg. (2021)) and the right “[N]ot to be jailed, fined, or otherwise penalized.”
§ 748.2(A)(3).
132
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Coercion in Contract Law, 5 U. ARK . L ITTLE R OCK
L. REV . 329, 329 (1982).
131
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labor laws protect workers from the coercive practices of both employers and
labor unions.133 The Fifth Amendment precludes a criminal defendant’s
coerced confessions from being introduced against them at trial.134 Debates
about coercion also inform many arguments for legal reform. For example,
some critics take prosecutorial exploitation of the plea-bargaining process to
constitute illegitimate coercion.135
In substantive criminal law, coercion is sometimes an element of an
offense. For such offenses, establishing the defendant’s criminal liability
requires the government to prove the defendant coerced a victim in some
specific, impermissible way.136 Examples of such coercion-based offenses
include kidnapping,137 blackmail,138 extortion,139 and

133

See Michael M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV . 1592,
1598–612 (2019).
134
See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961).
135
See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea
Bargaining, 57 W M . & M ARY L. REV . 1343, 1364–74 (2016); John H. Langbein, Torture
and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV . 3, 13 (1978).
136
See, e.g., OR. Rev. STAT. § 163.275 (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (McKinney,
Westlaw through L.2021, Ch. 440).
137
See, e.g., Jason R. Steffen, Criminalization: A Kantian View, 12 W ASH . U. JURIS.
REV . 27, 62 (2019) (contending that “[k]idnapping or otherwise coercing people into
actions against their will violates the freedom of movement that is . . . a condition of
justice” under Kant’s political philosophy).
138
The crime of blackmail is popularly understood as the “attempt to trade silence
for money.” See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1817 n.1 (1993); Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So
Hard to Resolve, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 587–88 (2012) (noting that U.S. blackmail
statutes differ on “(1) whether the offense is confined to demands for property, or whether
it also extends to demands that a victim engage in or refrain from conduct; (2) whether
the offense is confined to threats to disclose incriminating or embarrassing information,
or whether it also extends to threats to perform other lawful but unwelcome acts; (3)
whether it contains no exceptions or whether it permits actors to commit the offense under
specified circumstances; and (4) whether the offense is denominated ‘blackmail’ or
whether (as happens more frequently) it figures as a subset of more general offenses
of ‘extortion,’ criminal ‘threats,’ ‘theft,’ ‘larceny,’ or ‘coercion’”) (citations omitted).
139
The crime of extortion arises where the offender uses the threat of future violence
or some other unlawful act to extract something from a victim. See Paul H. Robinson,
Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical
Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX . L. REV . 291, 293 (2011). At common
law, extortion typically involved a demand of property, but in some jurisdictions, it now
encompasses demands that the victim perform an act or refrain from performing an act
he or she has the right to do. Id. at 311–12. Some jurisdictions, and the Model Penal Code,
treat this latter category of act/omission-motivated extortion as the separate crime of
“coercion.” See, e.g., OR. Rev. STAT. § 163.275 (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2021, Ch. 440). Furthermore, some states treat blackmail
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human trafficking.140
It is natural to suppose that the concept of coercion varies across legal
domains. However, there is significant consensus among commentators
about the basic way that coercion operates. Call this consensus view the
wrongful pressure model of coercion.141
Consider the crimes of extortion and blackmail. In extortion, the
extortionist proposes to bring about consequences for the target that are
unlawful unless the target acts in a specific way.142 Blackmail typically
involves a blackmailer proposing to bring about consequences for the
target that are otherwise legal but nevertheless undesired by the target unless
the target acts in a specific way.143 The paradigmatic extortionist says “your
money or your life,” while the paradigmatic blackmailer says “wouldn’t it be
as a form of extortion, with the blackmailing conduct constituting the unlawful act
element. See Westen, supra note 138, at 590 (citing sources).
140
Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV . 409, 416
(2011) (articulating legal notion of “situational coercion” that arises in human trafficking
contexts under which trafficked workers “comply with abusive working conditions due
to circumstances that render them vulnerable to exploitation, such as lack of legal
immigration status and poverty”).
141
See, e.g., Berman, Blackmail, supra note 28, at 66 (arguing that blackmail is “a
wrongful interference with the victim’s freedom because it puts wrongful pressure on his
liberty to do otherwise,” an “understanding of coercion that holds true in any normative
system, or across normative domains”); Berman, Normative Functions, supra note 28, at
53 (noting “broad agreement regarding the nature” of wrongful coercion that “conduct
that is designed to induce some person or entity, B, to engage in an action x, and that
operates by exerting wrongful pressure on B’s freedom to choose otherwise”); HARRY
FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 41 (1988) (“A coercive threat
arouses in its victim a desire—i.e., to avoid the penalty—so powerful that it will move
him to perform the required action regardless of whether he wants to perform it or
considers that it would be reasonable for him to do so.”); Vinit Haksar, Coercive
Proposals: Rawls and Gandhi, 4 POL. THEORY 65, 71 (1976) (contending that the moral
wrong of coercion is explained by wrongfulness of a “readiness to violate our moral duty”
and “either putting unfair or immoral pressure on the recipient or the taking of unfair
advantage of the recipient’s vulnerability”); ALAN W ERTHEIMER, COERCION 173 (1987)
(contending that deciding legal responsibility in duress cases requires determining
“whether the degree or type of pressure [on the defendant] is the sort that should negate
the agent’s responsibility”); Craig L. Carr, Duress and Criminal Responsibility, 10 L. &
PHIL. 161, 166 (1991) (“In general, to act under duress is to decide upon some course
of action while under unwanted and unwarranted pressure.”); Westen & Mangifiaco,
supra note 74, at 847 (coercive threats “bring pressure to bear upon bystanders” and
“dictate to bystanders what their aggressors exact as exclusive avenues of escape”).
142
See Robinson, Cahill & Bartels, supra note 140, at 293 (noting that extortion
“involves conditional threats to engage in criminal acts”).
143
See, e.g., Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail is So Hard to Resolve, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 585, 585–86 (2012); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of
Blackmail, 84 COLUM . L. REV . 670, 671 (1984).
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a shame if your secret was revealed?” The coerciveness of the extortionate
proposal is at the core of why extortion is morally wrong and appropriately
criminalized.144 Likewise, some contend that the coerciveness of the
blackmailer’s proposal is central to explaining why the blackmailer’s actions
are morally wrong and appropriately criminalized.145
How, exactly, does the extortionist or the blackmailer coerce their
target? Most contemporary commentators adopt a suite of presuppositions
about how coercion operates derived from the work of the philosophers
Robert Nozick and Alan Wertheimer.146 On this approach, coercion operates
“principally as a way in which one agent puts psychological pressure on
another to act or not act in some particular way by means of threats that alter
the costs and benefits of acting.”147 The primary theoretical task is to
“develop tests to determine which sorts or degrees of pressure will count as
coercive and what follows from such a judgment.”148 The coercer
“communicates implicitly or explicitly a conditional proposal, typically
involving a threat, against [the target], accompanied by some demand
regarding [the target’s] future actions.”149 The coercer’s proposal is salient to
the extent that it is “psychologically potent” for the target—that is, the target
regards the coercer’s proposal “as credible, and regards the outcome
portended as sufficiently undesirable that action to avoid the outcome is
warranted.150 In issuing the proposal, the coercer “negatively alters” the
“costs and benefits of actions” that would otherwise be open to the target,
144
For example, the Hobbs Act criminalizes “obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or affect[ing]
commerce” through “extortion,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and defines “extortion” as “the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” Id. at § 1951(b)(2).
145
See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives
Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV . 795 (1998) (defending coercion-based account of
criminalizing blackmail); Stephen Galoob, Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With
Blackmail, 22 LEGAL THEORY 22 (2016) (same). Coercion-based theories of blackmail
are controverted. See, e.g., Russell Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO . L.J. 739, 769
(2006) (contending that coercion-based accounts of blackmail “have failed to (i) find an
individual component which is, or should be, immoral or criminal, and (ii) explicate how
independently permissible components have a synergistic or combinatorial effect of
impermissibility”); Stuart Green, Theft by Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard
Bargaining, 44 W ASHBURN L.J. 553, 580 (2005) (defending an approach under which
extortion and blackmail are considered species of theft, rather than criminalizable solely
in terms of coercion).
146
See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL
THEORY 45, 45–47 (2002).
147
Anderson, supra note 30, at 3.
148
Id. (citations omitted).
149
Id. at 4.
150
Id.
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thereby making some actions “less desirable as choices.”151 Professor
Anderson calls this suite of propositions the pressure approach to coercion152
and contends that “arguably all of the most prominent philosophical analysts
in the last 40 years” adopt a pressure-based model of how coercion works.153
The pressure approach can be refined in an important way based on the
disjunction between so-called “moralized” and “non-moralized” views of
coercion. This debate concerns which kinds of communications count as
coercive. On a moralized view, a proposal is coercive only if the conduct or
consequence proposed would violate a normative expectations—for
example, by violating the target’s rights154 or making the target worse off
than they ought to be.155 On a non-moralized view, by contrast, a proposal
can be coercive if the proposed conduct or consequence would merely
deviate from normality—that is, what would have happened to the target in
the absence of the proposal.156 The main difference between moralized and
non-moralized views is whether normative terms must be used to specify the
baseline for determining whether the proposal applies sufficient pressure to
the target to render it coercive. Although theorists differ about whether
coercion must be moralized or may be non- moralized,157 a moralized notion

151

Id.
Anderson, supra note 30, at 1; see also William A. Edmundson, Coercion, in
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 451, 461 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2011)
(“A ‘pressure theory’ holds that coercion is at heart a matter of psychological pressure,
pure and simple, and that any action that creates or exploits such pressure is pro tanto
wrongful.”).
153
Anderson, supra note 30, at 5 n.13 (citations omitted).
154
See, e.g., W ERTHEIMER, supra note 141, at 217 (“Generally speaking, the moral
baseline approach rests on a theory of rights. To set B’s moral baseline, we need to know
what A is morally required to do for B (or not to do to B).”).
155
See, e.g., Berman, Normative Functions, supra note 28, at 86 (defining a proposal
as wrongfully coercive if “it involves a conditional threat . . . to violate a duty owed to the
addressee”).
156
See, e.g., Peter Westen, Freedom and Coercion–Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 579 (“[F]or the purposes of coercion, the relevant time period for
measuring the recipient’s condition is not the instant of the proposal, or a span of time
before the proposal, but the period after the proposal. The question is not whether the
proposal conditionally promises to leave a recipient worse off than he is, or worse off than
he has been, but whether it conditionally promises to leave him worse off than he
otherwise will be.”) (citations omitted); Ekow Yankah, The Force of Law, 42 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1195, 1223–24 (2008) (“[R]egardless of whether the pressure applied is wrongful,
pressure that restricts one’s ability to reasonably choose an option is coercive.”).
157
See Anderson, supra note 30, at 17 (identifying advocates of moralized approach
as including Alan Wertheimer, Mitchell Berman, Joseph Raz, Cheney Ryan, and Andrew
Hetherington and advocates of non-moralized approach as including Harry Frankfurt,
Michael Gorr, Joel Feinberg, and David Zimmerman).
152
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of coercion predominates discussions in criminal law.158 Under such
moralized views, the target is only subjected to coercion if the coercer’s
proposal generated sufficient pressure on the target and the pressure
generated by the coercer’s proposal violated the target’s normative
expectations in some way. Therefore, the model of coercion under
consideration here is most appropriately called a “wrongful pressure”
approach in order to capture the widespread assumption that an essentially
moralized notion of coercion operates in criminal law.
Suppose the Malibu sheriff says to Jeffrey Lebowski, “Stay out of
Malibu, Lebowski! Stay out of Malibu, deadbeat!”159 Implicit in this
statement is a proposal: if you enter Malibu, then you will be subject to
official violence; if you do not enter Malibu, then you will not be subject to
official violence. On the wrongful pressure approach, the sheriff’s proposal
would be coercive only if (a) the sheriff’s proposal causes Lebowski to
experience pressure to stay out of Malibu; and (b) actually staying out of
Malibu would make Lebowski worse off (for example, by violating his right
to travel to Malibu). If the first condition is not met, then Lebowski is not
coerced regardless of whether the sheriff meant for Lebowski to experience
pressure.160 Therefore, the wrongful pressure approach construes coercion as
what philosophers call a “success” term.161The target is coerced to the extent
that they “alter [their] behavior from the course it was on prior to receiving
the proposal” and not coerced if there is no alteration in behavior from the
baseline as a result of the coercer’s proposal.162
If the second condition is not met (for example, if Lebowski were
subject to an expulsion order at the time of his exchange with the officer),
then the condition referenced in the officer’s proposal would not be wrongful.
To be sure, the officer’s proposal might generate pressure on Lebowski to
stay out of town, but on the wrongful pressure model it would not constitute
coercion because staying out of Malibu would not worsen Lebowski’s
158

See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1613
(1994) (noting that “moralized approach[es]” to coercion “dominate discussion of the
problem” of how coercion bears on criminal responsibility).
159
This example is drawn from Stephen J. White, On the Moral Objection to
Coercion, 45 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 199, 199 (2017). The reference is to THE BIG LEBOWSKI
(Working Title Films 1998) if you’re not into the whole brevity thing.
160
On the lay distinction between coerciveness and coercion, see, for example, Grant
Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD . 39, 52 (2000) (noting that
coercion involves a threat that “succeeds in forcing the [target] to comply with whatever
is demanded,” while the term “‘coercive’ [is used] more liberally than this” to describe a
threat that is “intended to force someone to do something, whether or not it succeeds”).
161
Id. at 49–52.
162
See Anderson, supra note 30, at 4.
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position by comparison to a normative baseline. Thus, the wrongful pressure
approach provides a straightforward explanation of the difference between
threats and offers. When the coercer threatens the target, the coercer’s
proposal generates psychological pressure on the target to act in ways that
would worsen the target’s position regardless of how the target responds to
the proposition. This pressure violates the target’s normative expectations. In
the case of an offer, by contrast, the proposal would not set back the target’s
interest, and so does not violate the target’s normative expectations.163
The wrongful pressure model has been used to explain coercion-based
offenses such as blackmail and extortion, as well as the legal significance of
coercion in a variety of other contexts.164 Likewise, the wrongful pressure
model is implicit in many statutory definitions of coercion, including federal
human trafficking statutes.165 For example, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) criminalizes the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for
the purposes of a commercial sex act that is accomplished via “force, fraud,
or coercion.”166 The TVPA in turn defines “coercion” as including:
(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint againstany person;
(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to
perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person;
or

163

See, e.g., W ERTHEIMER, supra note 141, at 204 (“A threatens B by proposing to
make B worse off relative to some baseline; A makes an offer to B by proposing to make
B better off relative to some baseline.”).
164
For example, Kimberly Ferzan utilizes the model to explain how one person’s
exerting pressure on another might undermine the validity of the latter’s consent to sexual
relations. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent and Coercion, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 974
(2018) (arguing that determining the amount of coercion sufficient to undermine consent
to sexual relations “is about the kind of threats that are sufficiently restraining and place
sufficient pressure that we believe that consent no longer exists,” which is “a normative
judgment about where the person of ordinary firmness lies”). Steven Smith uses the
wrongful pressure model to explain the voidability of contracts entered into under duress.
Stephen A. Smith, Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
343, 345–46 (1997) (defending “wrongful pressure” account of contractual duress on
which “the concern . . . is with wrongdoing [that] wrongly exert[s] pressure”).
165
See also Christian Lee González Rivera, The Plight of “Unreasonable”
Trafficking Victims: Replacing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s Reasonable
Person Standard for Coercion with a Genuine Belief Standard, 40 W OMEN ’S RTS. L. REP.
272, 373 (2019) (contending that “operative legal framework to evaluate whether the
victim was coerced” under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act “resorts to amoralized,
objective standard”) (emphasis omitted).
166
22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2021).
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(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.167

The Code defines “serious harm” as:
[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or
reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances,
to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances
to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that
harm.168

Each of the elements of the wrongful pressure approach is realized in
the TVPA’s definition of coercion. The TVPA establishes a normative
baseline against which to measure coercion—namely, the target’s rights
against being harmed, restrained, or subject to abusive legal process. A
target’s proposal counts as coercive only if satisfying one of the conditions
of the proposal would set back the target in relation to these baselines.169 On
the other hand, a proposal is not coercive if satisfying the target would not
set back the target’s interests relative to these baselines. Thus, “engage in sex
work or you will be harmed” might constitute human trafficking under a
coercion theory, while “engage in sex work and you will be compensated”
cannot (at least prima facie) constitute coercion. The target’s experience of
pressure must be reasonable and it must arise from the proposal itself rather
than from some other basis (such as the history of encounter between the
coercer and the target or background social relationships, though those
factors could be relevant to the “circumstances” under which the target
receives the threat). Therefore, a coercer does not engage in coercion under
the TVPA (and is therefore not liable for human trafficking) in relation to a
target if coercer’s proposal plays no role in target’s engaging in sex work, if
satisfaction of coercer’s proposal would not endanger the specific interests
described in the statute, or if any pressure to engage in sex work that target
experiences is not a direct result of coercer’s proposal.
In addition to explaining how coercion works as an element of a
criminal offense, the wrongful pressure model can also explain the
availability of the duress defense in cases like Toscano. The bodily harm to
Toscano referenced in William Leonardo’s proposal is plainly wrongful.
Therefore, the main legal question at issue was whether William’s proposal
to Toscano generated a sufficient amount of pressure on Toscano to render
Toscano eligible for a duress defense. Each of the triggering conditions of
duress is relevant to answering this question. Toscano must point to a specific

167

22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2021).
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).
169
That said, given the broad definition of harm under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 almost
any conceivable form of interest setback could satisfy this criterion.
168
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threat by William; non-threats (such as William’s generalized reputation for
violence) cannot constitute coercion and therefore cannot ground a duress
defense. Toscano must establish a baseline expectation that was violated by
William’s proposal—in this case, his rights not to fill out fraudulent reports
(i.e., his interest in complying with the law) and not to be harmed or have his
spouse harmed. Toscano must also establish that William’s proposal was
efficacious in bringing about a specific psychological state in Toscano and
that this reaction was based on relatively sound reasoning by Toscano. Thus,
on the wrongful pressure model, the triggering conditions of duress explain
how a proposal might count as a token of coercion. If these triggering
conditions are satisfied, then the target might be coerced and therefore
eligible for a duress defense. If they are not satisfied (perhaps because the
target does not experience the proposal as generating pressure to act in a
specific way, or carrying out the proposal would not violate the target’s
normative expectations), then the target is not coerced and therefore is
ineligible for a duress defense.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE WRONGFUL PRESSURE APPROACH TO
COERCION

Despite its ubiquity, there are several significant problems with the
wrongful pressure model as an account of coercion generally and as applied
to coercive control contexts in particular. First, the wrongful pressure model
is either inconsistent or unprincipled in its treatment of background power
relations between the coercer and the target. The wrongful pressure model
allows background considerations to bear on some inquiries, for example
whether the coercer’s proposal counts as a threat in the first place170 and
whether a particular threat is credible.171 Yet the wrongful pressure approach
also holds that coercion can arise only from the coercer’s threat;172
170

See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988) (noting the possibility
that “threatening . . . an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of legal
coercion that induces involuntary servitude, even though such a threat made to an adult
citizen of normal intelligence would be too implausible to produce involuntary
servitude”); Wonnum v. State, 942 A.2d 569, 574 (Del. 2007) (“[A] ‘threat’ can also mean
an implied threat the genuineness of which can be reinforced by earlier conduct.”).
171
As Professor Anderson notes, the wrongful pressure model allows that the
credibility of a threat depends on “a set of dynamic, relational facts relevant to judging
the power differential between the threatener and threatened, and thus will include
considerations of the threatened party’s own powers, desires and intentions.” See
Anderson, supra note 30, at 19.
172
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 140, at 429–30, 434–36 (describing how “no reasonable
alternative” framework, which requires that a coercer make specific threats that are
“wrongfully intended to make the coercee worse off if the coercer’s demand is denied”
thus “leav[ing] a coerce with no reasonable alternative but to comply with the wishes
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background considerations are insufficient to establish coercion and
irrelevant in the absence of an individuated threat.173 This restriction misfires
in coercive control contexts where a pervasive pattern of coercion can obviate
the need for a coercer to threatena target. Indeed, from the perspective of a
coercer, one benefit of creating a pervasively coercive relationship is that the
target will internalize the coercer’s will such that the coercer need not
specifically threaten them in order to control them.
To illustrate this point, consider two variations on the G.M. case:
GM1: D.S. instantiates a pattern of systematic degradation and abuse
through which G.M. understands reliably that D.S. wishes G.M. to
engage in sex work, to criminally trespass, and to acquire controlled
dangerous substances whenever he desires drugs. One day, D.S. says to
no one in particular, “It sure would be nice if I had some drugs this
evening.” Solely as a result of her understanding of D.S.’s desire for
drugs, G.M. engages in sex work, criminal trespassing, and the
acquisition of controlled dangerous substances.
GM2: D.S. instantiates the same pattern of deprivation and abuse as in
GM1 and also issues a proposal to G.M. that [either you engage sex
work, criminally trespass, and acquire controlled dangerous substances
or else I will hurt your children]. Based solely on her understanding of
D.S.’s proposal, G.M. engages in sex work, criminal trespassing, and
the acquisition of controlled dangerous substances.
GM2 involves a threat while GM1 does not. Yet GM1 involves at least as
much coercion as GM2. However, on the wrongful pressure approach, the
coercer in GM2 would face liability for establishing episodic control over
G.M. via threatening while the coercer in GM1 would escape liability for
accomplishing exactly the same level of control without resorting to
threatening. This arrangement is implausible because the threat in GM2 is
not the sole (or even most meaningful) source of coercion. Likewise, G.M.
could likely successfully assert a duress defense in GM2 but likely not in
GM1. This result also seems objectionable. On the wrongful pressure
approach, background considerations related to the D.S.-G.M. relationship
bear on some parts of the inquiry (for example, how a reasonable person in
of the coercer,” was adopted as the legal test for involuntary servitude). Professor Kim
proposes an alternative, “situational coercion” framework under which the “nature
of [the] power relationship and whether it entails the dependence of the weaker party on
the stronger party” is sufficient to ground a claim of coercion. Id. at 461–62.
173
Id.
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G.M.’s position might have interpreted D.S.’s musings), but not on others
(e.g., whether G.M. was subjected to sufficient coercion in GM1). This
inconsistency is unjustified in coercive control contexts where background
conditions in a relationship obviate the need for specific threats. The
wrongful pressure view, then, attributes inconsistent and inadequate
significance to background considerations for determining whether coercion
exists.
Second, the wrongful pressure approach fails to capture important
features of what makes coercion objectionable and under what conditions
being subject to coercion should provide someone with a criminal defense.
The wrongful pressure approach construes coercion in terms of pressure. If
a proposal exerts pressure on the target, then it may be coercive. If it exerts
no such pressure, then it is not coercive. Yet someone can be coerced without
experiencing pressure. In coercive control contexts, for example, the target
might not experience pressure from the coercer’s proposal. Likewise, the
connection between the existence of coercion and an impacted action can be
more oblique as pervasive coercion blurs the distinction between what the
coercer wants and what the target wants.174 The implication that there is no
coercion if the coercer’s proposal does not prompt the target to experience
pressure is especially objectionable when the target’s lack of pressure is itself
attributable to efforts by the coercer.
To illustrate this point, consider two more hypothetical variations on
G.M.’s case.
GM3: One day, D.S. says to no one in particular, “It sure would be nice
if I had some drugs this evening.” As a result of a pattern of systematic
degradation and abuse by D.S., G.M. experiences pressure to engage in
sex work, criminally trespass, and acquire controlled dangerous
substances upon hearing D.S.’s statement and, as a result of this
pressure, engages in a pattern of sex work, criminally trespassing, and
acquiring controlled dangerous substances.
GM4: One day, D.S. says to no one in particular, “It sure would be nice
if I had some drugs this evening.” As a result of a pattern of systematic
degradation and abuse by D.S., G.M. incorporates D.S.’s goals into her
own deliberative set upon hearing D.S.’s statement. G.M. understands
that engaging in a pattern of sex work, criminally trespassing, and
acquiring controlled dangerous substances is the best way to realize the

174

See Kim, supra note 140, at 465–67.
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goal of obtaining drugs for D.S. that evening and, solely as a result of
this understanding, engages in these criminally prohibited activities.
GM4 involves at least the same objectionably coercive features as GM3.
Indeed, the alienation of the target in GM4 arguably reflects a greater degree
of coercion than in GM3. Yet, on the wrongful pressure model, only GM3
could count as an instance of coercion since only in that case is D.S.’s desire
experienced by G.M. as an “alien” will or imposition.175 If both GM3 and
GM4 involve at least the same objectionably coercive features, then a target
can be coerced even though they do not experience pressure.
The explanatory inadequacy here arises from defining coercion in terms
of pressure. Coercion involves exercises of power. Pressure is often, but not
always, an indication of an objectionable power relationship. Put differently,
the coercer’s control over the target (reflected in the coercer’s ability to
generate alterations to the target’s course of action “at will” and the coercer’s
“willingness to do so”)176 is both the most objectionable feature of coercive
relationships and the primary basis for providing the target with an
affirmative defense to criminal liability. The pressure experienced by the
target is sometimes a lagging or imperfect indicator of the coercer’s exercise
of power. If power and pressure go together, then analyzing coercion as a
matter of the target’s experience of pressure seems sensible as a proxy.
However, where power and pressure come apart, it is important to be precise
about what matters. Coercion is just as objectionable (and just as strong a
basis for a defense) if the coercer’s control over the target is effectuated
without the target’s experiencing pressure.
Third, the wrongful pressure model appraises coercion in connection
with a baseline. A proposal regarding engaging in a specific activity is
coercive if the target’s engaging in that activity would set back their interests
relative to a baseline. Likewise, a proposal is not coercive if the target’s
engaging in that activity would leave the target at least as well in relation to
the baseline.177 The latter are offers rather than threats. Yet it is possible for
175
See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems, in
REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 102, 102 (Cecile Laborde & John Maynor eds.,
2008) (articulating republican conception of freedom as non-domination that defines
“liberty as the absence of alien or alienating control on the part of other persons”).
176
Anderson, supra note 30, at 22.
177
Id. at 5–6; see also Scott Altman, Divorcing Threats and Offers, 15 L. & PHIL. 209,
211 (1996) (proposing “multiple baselines” approach to coercion that utilizes both
moralized and non-moralized baselines); W ERTHEIMER, supra note 141, at 212 (defending
essentially moralized notion of baselines); Michael Gorr, Toward a Theory of Coercion,
16 CAN. J. PHIL. 383, 398–99 (1986) (positing a theory of coercive baselines under which
the target’s preferences are a “controlling factor in all cases,” not merely in cases where
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A to coerce B even when it is impossible to establish a baseline against which
to assess A’s proposal. The invocation of a baseline assumes that coercion is
a synchronic or transactional phenomenon,178 with the coerciveness of an
imposition appraised against a non-coercive comparator. This assumption is
unwarranted where coercion is better understood as a diachronic
phenomenon—that is, where coercion is more temporally extended and
necessarily interacts with past and future events.
For example, the wrongful pressure model misfires where the
remoteness or unintelligibility of a non-coercive baseline precludes or
distorts comparisons. To illustrate, consider two further hypothetical
variations on G.M.’s case:
GM5: The facts of G.M.’s actual case applies. However, had G.M.
stayed in the Dominican Republic and not returned to the United States
with D.S., G.M. would not have been subject to comparable pressure to
engage in sex work, criminally trespass, and acquire controlled
dangerous substances as she experienced from D.S. in the actual case.
GM6: The facts of G.M.’s actual case apply. However, had G.M. stayed
in the Dominican Republic and not returned to the United States with
D.S., G.M. would have been subject to comparable pressure, from some
other party, to engage in sex work, criminally trespass, and acquire
controlled dangerous substances as she experienced from D.S. in the
actual case.
GM6 involves at least as much coercion as GM5. Imagining a world in which
G.M. had not been coerced by D.S. is irrelevant to concluding that D.S.
coerced G.M. However, the wrongful pressure model reaches the opposite
conclusion because it bases the question of whether G.M. was coerced by
D.S. largely on considerations related to how G.M.’s life would have gone in
alternative scenarios (such as a world in which G.M. had never met D.S. or
one in which he had not abused and deprived her). On a straightforward
interpretation of the wrongful pressure model, only GM5 could count as an
instance of coercion because only in this scenario would D.S.’s threats set
moral and normal expectations diverge); David Zimmerman, Taking Liberties: The Perils
of “Moralizing” Freedom and Coercion in Social Theory and Practice, 28 SOC. THEORY
& PRAC. 577, 577 (2002) (arguing that moralization of baselines is “a bad practice in any
social or political morality that purports to take liberty and coercion as normatively basic,
because it renders these features of social and political institutions and practices strictly
derivative”).
178
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 972.
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back G.M.’s interests compared to what would have happened otherwise or
what was happening before. Put differently, the wrongful pressure approach
would dictate that G.M. was not harmed by D.S.’s efforts in GM6 because
she would have been subject to similar pressure to engage in unlawful
activities regardless of whether D.S. threatened her. This result is
paradoxical because it implies that oppressed people cannot be coerced.
The wrongful pressure model is the standard way of conceptualizing
coercion in criminal law. Yet this model is explanatorily inadequate.179 It
misconstrues why coercion is wrong and why being subject to coercion
should provide someone with a defense to liability. The wrongful pressure
model misfires in coercive control contexts because it overattributes
significance to certain considerations (in particular, the specification of a
baseline and the psychological experience of the target), while implausibly
denying the significance of other considerations (such as the background
relationship between the putative coercer and the target) that seem obviously
relevant.
Improving the wrongful pressure model requires an account of coercion
to explain core cases, to consistently explain the relevance of background
considerations, and to explain why considerations such as the target’s
experience of pressure or the degree to which a proposal deviates from a
baseline matters in some but not all instances of coercion. Such a proposal
would establish the fundamental link between coercion and power. The next
Part articulates and defends such a model.
IV. COERCION-BASED DEFENSES: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH
This Part develops an alternative model of coercion in criminal law
based on what Professor Scott Anderson has called the “enforcement
approach” to coercion. Section A describes the enforcement approach and
establishes why the enforcement approach is superior to the wrongful
pressure approach. Section B extends the enforcement approach to coercionbased defenses.

179
To be sure, the wrongful pressure model does not arrive at the incorrect answer in
every case. Indeed, the model correctly identifies some paradigmatic cases of coercion.
For example, in Toscano, the wrongful pressure model allows the conclusion that
Toscano was subject to coercion after he was threatened by William Lombard, but not
before. State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 758–59 (N.J. 1977). The wrongful pressure model
also rules out some paradigmatic cases of non-coercion, such as why ineffectual threats
do not establish coercion or ground a coercion-based defense. Id.
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A. THE ENFORCEMENT APPROACH AND COERCION

What Professor Anderson calls the enforcement approach to coercion
states that
“[C]oercion is best understood as one agent’s employing power suited to determine,
through enforceable constraints, what another agent will or (more usually) will not do,
where the sense of enforceability here is exemplified by the use of force, violence and
threats thereof to constrain, disable, harm, or undermine an agent’s ability to act.180

While the wrongful pressure approach posits that the coercer’s primary
role is to communicate a threat, the enforcement approach construes the
coercer as either creating or leveraging a power differential over the putative
target.181 The coercer’s willingness and ability to draw upon these relational
powers over the target makes coercion possible.182 The effect of a coercer’s
deployment of power over a target is to change the target’s practical
necessities, for example by “immediately foreclos[ing]” some “possibilities
for action” or to make it “practically necessary” for the target to “avoid the
situation” that the coercer proposes to bring about or to “exit the situation
once it has been brought about.”183 Moreover, the alterations to the target’s
practical necessities are robust across changes in the world, a phenomenon
that Professor Gideon Yaffe calls “tracking.”184 On the enforcement
approach, coercion reflects a specific “kind of power that some agents have
over others by being able to obstruct, disable or undermine broadly the
latter’s ability to act, ‘willy nilly.’”185
On the enforcement approach, the paradigmatic instance of coercion is
“grabbing, manacling and imprisoning a person to prevent him from
acting.”186 According to Professor Anderson, core cases of coercion

180
Anderson, supra note 30, at 6. Professor Anderson’s use of the term “enforcement
approach” is synonymous with what, elsewhere, he calls the “stopping power” approach
to coercion—that is, the idea that coercion “encompass[es] uses of force, threats of force
and violence, and other enforcement techniques based on the willingness and ability of
some to create and/or employ stopping power against others.” See Scott A. Anderson,
Conceptualizing Rape as Coerced Sex, 127 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 50, 78 (2016).
181
Anderson, supra note 30, at 7.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Gideon Yaffe, Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will, 67 PHIL. & PHENOM .
RES. 335, 346–47 (2003).
185
Anderson, supra note 30, at 8.
186
Id. at 6; see also id. at 8 (“Imprisonment is the paradigm form of coercion . . . .
Even if it were not regarded as a penalty, it would still be effective in frustrating the efforts
of the recalcitrant to prevent a judicial decision being implemented.”) (citing J.R. LUCAS,
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 60 (1966)).
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encompass police utilizing their powers to arrest and jail suspects; the law’s ability to
inhibit certain behaviors by criminalizing them, or its ability to enforce contracts and
civil laws through police powers; robbers and Mafiosi who utilize similar powers for
less noble goals; and men who use violence or intimations of violence to impose
themselves sexually on women or other men. Other cases may be counted as coercion
according to their likeliness to these kinds of examples.187

The coerciveness of proposals is a function of how closely they resemble or
draw from these paradigmatic forms of using powers to disable or constrain
the target.188 On the enforcement approach, coercion does not arise in every
situation that someone holds power to alter another person. Rather,
determining whether an exercise of power constitutes coercion “depends on
what use the stronger party makes of his strength and whether that use [of
power] generates (or threatens to generate) significant incapacity on the part
of the weaker party.”189
The enforcement approach differs from the wrongful pressure approach
in several ways. The wrongful pressure approach sees the wrong-making
feature of coercion as essentially connected with harm—the state of affairs
contemplated in the coercer’s proposal would set back the target’s interests
in comparison with a baseline. The wrongful pressure approach sees coercion
as a success term: if the target does not experience pressure as a result of the
proposal, then the proposal is not an instance of coercion. By contrast, the
enforcement approach construes the wrong-making feature in coercion as a
specific kind of domination that might be called usurpation.190 In making a
187
Anderson, supra note 30, at 7; see also id. at 9 (noting that on the enforcement
approach, “the principal mode of coercion is prevention; inducement to perform specific
acts typically follows on the ability to prevent many or even all other acts”).
188
Id. at 7.
189
Id. at 12.
190
Examples of views that construe coercion in terms of usurpation, rather than
wrongful pressure, include ARTHUR RIPSTEIN , FORCE AND FREEDOM 43–44 (2009) (“I
usurp your powers if I exercise them for my own purposes, or get you to exercise them
for my purposes. If I use force of fraud to get you to do something for me that you would
not otherwise do, I wrong you, even if the cost I impose on you is small. I have used you
and in so doing made your choice subject to mine, and deprived you of the ability to
decide what to do.”) (emphasis omitted); Japa Pallikkathayil, The Possibility of Choice:
Three Accounts of the Problem with Coercion, 11 PHIL. IMPRINT 1, 17 (2011) (defending
“impaired normative authority” account of the wrongfulness of coercion, under which
“contingency announcements that violate the [target’s] moral-veto conception of power
over the proceedings make impossible the exercise of [the target’s] normative
discretionary powers more generally, not simply the power to consent”); Grant Lamond,
Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 215, 237 (A.
P. Simester & A. T.H. Smith eds., 1996) (noting that coercion via forced choice arises
out of infringing the “control that the [target] enjoys over some sphere”); James R. Shaw,
The Morality of Blackmail, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165, 167–68 (2012) (articulating an
account of “basic coercion” according to which coercive impositions wrong the target by
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coercive proposal, the coercer works to commandeer the target’s decisional
power. Coercion is wrongful when this usurpation is unjustified.191 For
example, if Lebowski has a right to decide whether to be in Malibu, then the
sheriff’s proposal is wrongfully coercive to the extent that it aims to take
control over Lebowski’s authority to decide whether to be in Malibu. The
connection between coercion and usurpation illustrates the inchoate nature
of coercion. In general, an action constitutes usurpation at the time that the
usurper attempts to seize power, regardless of whether this attempt actually
succeeds.192 Likewise, on the enforcement approach, coercion is a form of
wielding power.193 An actor with relational power over a target wields that
power via making a proposal, regardless of whether the target complies with
the proposal.
Thus, on the enforcement approach, coercion is not a success term.
Someone with relational power over a target can coerce that target by making
a coercive proposal even though the target experiences no “overt pressure to
do” as the coercer proposes.194 This analysis gives rise to a third major
difference between the two approaches: while the wrongful pressure view
assesses coercion primarily from the target’s perspective, the enforcement
approach assesses coercion primarily from the coercer’s perspective.195
To embrace the enforcement approach is not to deny that coercion can
ever work as the wrongful pressure account posits. Rather, the enforcement
approach provides a more fundamental explanation of cases that the wrongful
pressure approach appears to explain correctly. In Professor Anderson’s
words, where the wrongful pressure approach succeeds, it does so only
because “it tacitly assumes that coercion works in the way the enforcement
approach depicts explicitly.”196

interfering with the target’s authority to deliberate about what to do); White, supra
note 159, at 230 (“Coercion is an affront to a person’s autonomy in that its use fails to
respect that person’s right to make up his own mind about whether to pursue a certain
option, given his circumstances and the alternatives available to him.”).
191
Exercises of power that are morally acceptable constitute morally acceptable
coercion. Thanks to Scott Anderson for highlighting the need for this clarification.
192
See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, O N THE EDGE OF A NARCHY 156–59 (1993)
(interpreting John Locke’s theory of legitimate action to note that officials who act
or plan to breach the trust of their office “forfeit the power the people had put into their
hands”); Gabriel S. Mendlow, Thoughts, Crimes, and Thought Crimes, 118 M ICH . L. REV .
841, 848–50 (2019) (discussing the Treason Act of 1351, which defined treason in
terms of “compassing the death of the king”).
193
See Anderson, supra note 30, at 9.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 9–10.
196
Id. at 2.
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For example, the wrongful pressure approach appears to explain the
Toscano case. William Leonardo’s credible threat to Toscano was coercive
because, after the threat was issued, Toscano felt pressured to participate in
Leonardo’s scheme.197 However, the credibility of Leonardo’s threat was a
function of the background power relations between the reputed gangster and
the chiropractor. If Leonardo lacked the power to inflict violence on Toscano
and his family, then Leonardo’s conduct would not have been an instance of
coercion. Likewise, if Leonardo had not invoked this power differential via
his proposition to Toscano, then Leonardo’s action would not have been an
instance of coercion. To the extent that the pressure experienced by Toscano
matters, it matters as part of Leonardo’s effort to change Toscano’s practical
necessities, to commandeer Toscano’s decision about what to do.
While the enforcement approach and the wrongful pressure approach
overlap in identifying some instances of wrongful coercion, the enforcement
approach is still superior. Threats and other coercive proposals are common
tactics for those who seek to exercise control over others. Despite this
overlap, the enforcement approach is superior to the wrongful pressure
approach because the latter misfires in categories of cases that exhibit
coercion but do not, on their face, resemble an arms-length paradigm of
coercion through coercive threats. In such cases, the coercer exercises his or
her agency to usurp the decisional authority of the target. However, the
control sought (and, perhaps, obtained) by the coercer is not tied to any
specific proposal, and the target does not necessarily experience the coercer’s
efforts as an alien imposition. Coercive control cases, including many human
trafficking cases, illustrate how one person can coerce another without threats
and without the target feeling pressure.
The enforcement approach improves on the wrongful pressure approach
in all three ways identified above in Part III Section B. First, the enforcement
approach provides a principled and consistent explanation of how
background considerations matter to establishing coercion. The enforcement
approach allows for the possibility of normatively (and legally) significant
coercion that is not triggered by an explicit or implicit threat. On the
enforcement approach, wrongful coercion is an abuse of power. Such an
abuse can arise from the coercer’s explicit threat, such as “Stay out of Malibu,
Lebowski!” An implicit threat can also count as a utilization of power, such
as William Leonardo invoking the fact that Toscano had “just moved into a
place that has a very dark entrance and [lived] there” with his wife as part of
his proposal for Toscano to join in the fraudulent scheme.198 In both types of
197
198

State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1977).
Id.
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cases, the coercer communicates to the target a willingness to utilize physical
force to “constrain or disable” the target in order to change the target’s
practical deliberation regarding doing as the coercer wishes.199
However, one can inappropriately exercise power over another in the
absence of threats or specific proposals. For example, in interpersonal
relationships characterized by coercive control, the target’s practical
possibilities might be constrained regardless of whether the coercer issues an
explicit or implicit threat. To illustrate this point, recall the distinction
between hypothetical cases GM1 (in which D.S. instantiates a pattern of
coercive control but does not threaten G.M.) and GM2 (in which D.S.
instantiates coercive control and threatens G.M.).200 On the wrongful
pressure approach, GM1 does not involve coercion because D.S. did not
threaten G.M. On the enforcement approach, D.S.’s coercive control could
work to commandeer G.M.’s authority to decide what to do. Given the
dynamics of their relationship, issuing an explicit or implicit threat by D.S.
would be superfluous. When applied to coercive control contexts, then, the
enforcement approach allows for coercion without an individuated
connection between a coercive threat and a target’s action.
Second, the enforcement approach better captures the phenomenology
of coercion—in particular, the possibility of an oblique connection between
a coercive imposition and a target’s action. As Professor Anderson puts it,
the enforcement approach allows for an understanding of coercion “without
delving into particular facts about an individual’s weighing of specific
alterations to their costs and benefits of acting.”201 Someone can be
imprisoned regardless of whether they feel that they are imprisoned.
Therefore, the enforcement approach can identify coercion in cases where
the coercer has taken steps to commandeer the target’s right and power to
decide what to do and deploys that power on a specific occasion, even if the
target is insensitive to the coercer’s usurpation or deployment.
As such, the enforcement approach can explain how coercion arises just
in GM3 (where D.S. does not threaten G.M., but G.M. feels pressure to
engage in sex work, trespass, and acquire controlled dangerous substances)
as well as in GM4 (where G.M. does not feel any such pressure but rather
takes on D.S.’s goals as her own).202 On the wrongful pressure approach,
GM4 could not count as an instance of coercion because G.M. does not
experience D.S.’s proposal as an alien imposition. Yet, on the enforcement

199
200
201
202

See Anderson, supra note 30, at 12.
See supra p. 301.
Id. at 24.
See supra p. 302-03.
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approach, D.S.’s proposal could be considered a token of coercion based on
the background of degradation and domination in their relationship. What
matters for determining the existence of coercion is D.S.’s attempt to
appropriate G.M.’s decisional authority, rather than G.M.’s experience of
that attempted appropriation.
Third, the enforcement approach eliminates the need to invoke baselines
when determining the existence of coercion. As noted above, the wrongful
pressure approach classifies a proposal as coercive only if making of the
proposal (or carrying it out) would worsen the target’s situation in
comparison with a baseline.203 By contrast, the enforcement approach can
identify coercion solely by assessing the coercer’s usurpation of the target’s
rights or powers and willingness to utilize this usurped power.204 Therefore,
a proposal can coerce a target even if it improves the target’s position or the
target would have been subject to similar infringements by others in the
absence of the coercer’s proposal.
The enforcement approach can explain how coercion can arise in a
rough and unjust world. The wrongful pressure approach links coercion to
harm: a proposal can only coerce if the making and/or carrying out of the
proposal would render the target worse off. Yet in the GM6 scenario, D.S.’s
proposal would not render G.M. worse off because she would be subject to
equally powerful pressure to engage in illegal activity if D.S. had never made
his proposal. This conclusion is puzzling because GM6 involves at least as
much coercion as GM5 (in which G.M. would not have been subject to
equivalent pressure to engage in illegal activity in the absence of D.S.’s
proposal). The enforcement approach can resolve this puzzle. Both cases
evince coercion because both involve D.S.’s creating a power differential
with G.M. over time and leveraging that power differential to alter what G.M.
regards as practically necessary (e.g., returning to the United States and
engaging in illegal activities). What matters to identifying coercion is D.S.’s
attempt to usurp G.M.’s authority to make decisions about what to do, rather
than whether this usurpation makes G.M. worse off than she would have been
otherwise.

203

See Anderson, supra note 30, at 5–6.
Id. at 22 (“[T]hreats render particular acts or omissions less choice-worthy by
increasing their relative costs. But is such an alteration in costs necessary or sufficient to
explain the coerciveness of coercive threats . . . ? No: such alterations should be
recognized as epiphenomenal, rather than constitutive of coercion. What does the work
instead is the coercer’s ability (i.e., power) to generate such alterations at will, and his
willingness to do so.”).
204
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B. THE ENFORCEMENT APPROACH AND COERCION-BASED
DEFENSES

Professor Anderson’s writing on the enforcement approach aims
primarily to explicate what coercion is and why coercion might be wrong,
rather than to explain how being subject to coercion could provide a defense
to moral responsibility or criminal liability for a coerced action.205 However,
the enforcement approach provides a foundation for coercion-based
defenses. Elaborating this point requires extending Professor Anderson’s
insights about the enforcement approach to answer these slightly different
normative and legal questions.
Recall that, on the enforcement approach, coercion is not a success
term—a target is subject to coercion when the coercer employs “power suited
to determine, through enforceable constraints, what [the target] will or (more
usually) will not do.”206 A target is coerced at the moment that the coercer
“draw[s] upon the distinctive powers needed for coercion” in order to
“constrain or alter the activities” of the target or others.207 However, a
different standard must apply for asserting a coercion-based defense. Here,
coercion should be considered a success term. Otherwise, a coercer’s
unsuccessful attempt to usurp the target’s decisional authority might
nevertheless ground a coercion-based defense for the target. Moreover,
coercion-based defenses arising in criminal law implicate a specific and
important interest of the target: namely, the interest in complying with the
law. Establishing a coercion-based defense should require not only showing
that the coercer engaged in wrongful coercion, but also that the coercer
actually exercised control over the target’s decision regarding obeying the
law.
Just as the enforcement approach and wrongful pressure approach
overlap in identifying cases of wrongful coercion, they can also converge in
their verdicts about coercion-based defenses. Even so, the two approaches
identify different considerations as normatively salient. Consider again the
Toscano example. Under the wrongful pressure approach, Toscano would be
eligible for a duress defense if (a) William Leonardo threatened him and his
wife with serious bodily harm for Toscano’s non-participation in the scheme,
(b) Toscano believed that Leonardo’s threat was genuine (which would have
given him good reason to participate in the billing fraud scheme), and (c)
Toscano felt pressure to participate in the scheme because of the threat.
205

Id. at 30 (“[T]he enforcement approach could not, without supplementation,
explain whether and how coercion affects responsibility for coerced acts.”).
206
Id. at 6.
207
See id. at 7.
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Similarly, the enforcement approach could support the conclusion that
Toscano was subject to coercion sufficient to ground a duress defense.
Toscano had a right to decide not to participate in an illegal billing fraud
scheme and a strong interest in not doing so. Leonardo’s threat to Toscano
sought to change Toscano’s deliberative situation, thereby coopting
Toscano’s authority to decide what to do and undermining Toscano’s interest
in obeying the law. Toscano’s eligibility for a duress defense would turn on
whether Leonardo succeeded in this effort to usurp Toscano’s decisional
authority, and Leonardo’s reputation for violence would be highly relevant
to this inquiry.
On both approaches, Toscano would be ineligible to raise a duress
defense solely based on Leonardo’s reputation for violence. On the wrongful
pressure approach, someone’s reputation for violence does not constitute a
threat and so cannot trigger a duress defense. Under the enforcement
approach, someone’s reputation for violence does not count as an invocation
of power, and so cannot by itself constitute wrongful coercion. Likewise,
neither approach would allow Toscano to assert a duress defense if he had
thought that Leonardo’s proposal was a joke. On the wrongful pressure
approach, if Toscano had understood Leonardo to be joking, then the
proposal would not have generated sufficient pressure on Toscano to count
as coercion. On the enforcement approach, Leonardo’s efforts would not
have succeeded in changing Toscano’s deliberative situation if Toscano had
understood them as a joke, regardless of whether Leonardo had intended to
effectuate such a change. (In such a scenario, the enforcement approach
might support the conclusion that Leonardo coerced Toscano and that
Toscano is ineligible for a coercion-based defense.)
Despite this overlap, the enforcement approach to coercion-based
defenses differs from the wrongful pressure approach in at least two
important ways. First, while the wrongful pressure approach requires that a
coercion-based defense be triggered by the coercer’s threat, the enforcement
approach allows for triggering via any efforts of the coercer to invoke power
over the target or exploit a power differential, regardless of whether these
efforts take the propositional form of an explicit or implicit threat.208
Importantly, the enforcement approach can allow for a coercion-based
defense to be triggered by pervasive methods of indoctrination such as
“brainwashing,” since these efforts functional similarly to coercive threats.209
Thus, on the enforcement approach, Toscano could have been eligible for a
208

See Anderson, supra note 30, at 1.
See Yaffe, supra note 184, at 341, 343 (positing an account of manipulation under
which “the best explanation for the freedom-undermining force of both” indoctrination
and coercion involves robustly producing a “pattern of response to reasons” in the target).
209
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coercion-based defense if William Leonardo had merely requested that
Toscano commit billing fraud but avoided implicitly threatening Toscano
and his wife. Such a request by Leonardo might count as leveraging his
reputation for violence in order to commandeer Toscano’s decision whether
to commit billing fraud, thereby wrongfully coercing Toscano.
Second, the enforcement approach would posit different conditions for
asserting a coercion-based defense than the wrongful pressure approach.
Recall that, on the wrongful pressure approach, coercion succeeds when a
coercer’s threat exerts sufficient pressure on the target to act in ways that
would worsen the target’s situation. Legal standards vary in their definition
of legally sufficient pressure. In many jurisdictions only unlawful threats to
cause “grievous bodily (life-threatening) harm” can satisfy this standard,210
while under the Model Penal Code’s formulation the question is whether “a
person of reasonable firmness . . . would have been unable to resist” the
threat.211 On either approach, if the harm threatened is less salient (for
example, if the threat concerns an “economic or reputational injury” or
concerns “physical harm to property”212), then the target is ineligible for a
coercion-based defense because the threat generated legally insufficient
pressure to ground a coercion-based defense.
The enforcement approach utilizes different standards. First, a target’s
eligibility for a coercion-based defense requires a coercive imposition by the
coercer, although this imposition need not take the form of an explicit or
implicit threat. Consider what distinguishes the coercer’s attempt to usurp the
target’s decisional authority (e.g., “Do X if you know what’s good for you!”)
from an advisor’s providing decision-relevant information to an advisee (e.g.,
“Do X; it would be really good for you!”). Although both types of
impositions might involve a change to the advisee’s practical situation, the
advisee unquestionably retains decision-making authority while the target
might not.213
Second, eligibility for a coercion-based defense also requires that the
coercer succeed in usurping the target’s decisional authority. Success along
these lines can be defined in a number of ways. Professor Anderson
articulates it in terms of the coercer’s ability to “obstruct, disable or
undermine broadly the [target’s] ability to act, ‘willy nilly.’”214 If, in the wake
210

See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 107, at 271.
See M ODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 75, § 2.09(1).
212
See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 107, at 271.
213
To use Professor Yaffe’s terminology, the coercer’s efforts track the target’s
actions by foreclosing mechanisms to responding to reasons in closely related worlds,
while the advisor’s efforts do not. See Yaffe, supra note 184, at 344–45.
214
See Anderson, supra note 30, at 8.
211

2022]

COERCION-BASED DEFENSES

311

of a coercive imposition, a coercer has both sought and acquired this power,
then the usurpation would be successful. Another (perhaps complementary)
definition of successful coercion can be formulated in terms of what
Christopher McCammon calls “impositional power,” or the power of a
coercer to impose their will on the target, with “rational assurance that their
chances of successfully imposing that will” on the target “are high.”215
Successful coercion might also be specified in terms of the coercer’s taking
advantage of the target’s vulnerability216 or the target’s subordination to the
coercer.217
Rather than resolve these debates about the nature of successful
coercion, this Article stipulates the following criteria: for the purposes of
determining eligibility for a coercion-based defense, usurpation succeeds
when a coercer acquires a robust power to compel the target’s decision about
what to do by changing the target’s reasons to act as the coercer wishes.218
Some tokens of coercion attempt to change the target’s practical situation but
fail to do so. For example, in the wake of a coercive imposition, the coercer
might seek but fall short of acquiring power to give the target reason to act
as the coercer wants. Likewise, an imposition might change the target’s
reasons to act without doing so robustly—that is, fully determinatively of the
target’s range of actions. Consider Professor Gideon Yaffe’s distinction
between a ship carrying heavy cargo that will not survive a storm ahead from
a ship carrying the same cargo that is threatened by pirates. Although both
the storm and the pirates might impose pressure on the ship’s captain to ditch
the cargo, the impetus provided by the pirates is robust in a way that the
impetus provided by the storm is not.219 As Professor Yaffe puts it, “the storm
doesn’t care if we hold the cargo and allow for the sinking of the ship rather
than throw the cargo overboard, while, standardly at least, pirates prefer the
latter option to the former.”220 If either the efficacy or robustness element is
215
Christopher McCammon, Domination: A Rethinking, 125 ETHICS 1028, 1041
(2015). Professor McCammon adds that domination includes both “impositional power”
and “deliberative isolation,” such that the coercer is not accountable to anyone else for
how they exercise power over the target. Id. at 1046.
216
See, e.g., Saba Bazargan, Moral Coercion, 14 PHIL. IMPRINT 1, 6–9 (2014)
(arguing that the wrongfulness of coercion is explained, in part, by aim-hacking, or
leveraging the target’s aims and goals as a means of furthering the coercer’s ends).
217
See, e.g., Niko Kolodny, What Makes Threats Wrong?, 58 ANALYTIC PHIL. 87, 109
(2017) (“[T]he objection to being under the power of others is rooted in a broader concern
not to be subordinate to others within a social hierarchy, or the human equivalent of a
pecking order . . . .”).
218
This standard essentially grafts Professor Yaffe’s notion of “tracking” onto
Professor Anderson’s enforcement approach.
219
Yaffe, supra note 185, at 355.
220
Id.
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unsatisfied, then the target is ineligible for a coercion-based defense despite
having been coerced.
The enforcement approach to coercion-based defenses involves
normative as well as empirical criteria. In the wake of a coercive imposition,
a target’s eligibility to assert a coercion-based defense can turn not only on
whether the target has in fact relinquished robust decisional authority but also
on a normative assessment of any such relinquishment. In other words, the
enforcement approach could allow that a target who has wrongfully
relinquished decisional authority to a coercer is ineligible to assert a
coercion-based defense. Without fully resolving deeper debates about
coercion and autonomy, it seems possible to derive at least some generic
standards of normative assessment for the enforcement approach. For
example, eligibility for a coercion-based defense would likely vary based on
the target’s interest in retaining authority to make specific kinds of decision.
Given such variations in interest strength, a coercer’s imposition might usurp
a target’s authority to make decisions regarding less important considerations
while failing (or, more accurately, failing to provide sufficient reason) to
usurp the target’s authority to decide more important kinds of questions. To
the extent that there is a strong generic interest in law compliance, the
enforcement approach would allow for a heightened standard for determining
when a coercer has acquired power over a target decisional authority
regarding obeying the law and, therefore, whether a target is eligible for a
coercion-based defense.
Although the enforcement approach bases eligibility for a coercionbased defense on a normative evaluation of the target, this evaluation is
essentially comparative and less exacting than the evaluation licensed under
the wrongful pressure view. The latter asks whether a reasonable person in
the target’s position would have succumbed to the pressure; the target is not
coerced (and thus ineligible for a coercion-based defense) if they fail to live
up to this standard. On the enforcement approach, by contrast, the target is
ineligible for a coercion-based defense if the coercer’s usurpation would have
failed to coopt the target’s decisional authority regarding an interest less
significant than the interest in law compliance. How a reasonable person in
the target’s position might have responded is irrelevant to this inquiry.
Consider how the view advanced here might apply in G.M.’s case and
the hypothetical variations introduced above. D.S.’s systematic deprivation
and abuse of G.M. constituted wrongful coercion. D.S. aimed to take control
over G.M.’s ability to make decisions for herself, including decisions related
to obeying criminal prohibitions on sex work, trespass, and drug
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possession.221 In light of D.S.’s coercion, G.M.’s eligibility for a coercionbased defense to criminal liability would turn on whether D.S.’s efforts
succeeded. This question is in part an empirical one. If D.S. succeeded in
taking control of G.M.’s practical deliberation, then G.M. would take herself
to have compelling practical reason to do what D.S. commanded or merely
wished to be done solely because of what D.S. commanded or wished,
regardless of whether G.M. otherwise would have compelling reason not to
act in those ways (for example, because they were prohibited by law). G.M.’s
eligibility for a coercion-based defense would turn on a further normative
evaluation regarding whether D.S.’s imposition succeeded (or would have)
in coopting G.M.’s interests in matters less weighty than law compliance.
The enforcement approach would ask three empirical questions
regarding G.M.’s eligibility for a coercion-based defense. First, one might
deny G.M. a coercion-based defense to charges of prostitution, criminal
trespass, and drug possession by denying that D.S.’s impositions were
sufficient to constitute wrongful coercion. This is a question of fact: perhaps
D.S. attempted to take control over D.M.’s practical deliberation but failed
to achieve this control.
Second, one might also deny that D.S.’s efforts took control over G.M.’s
practical authority in a robust way. Perhaps G.M. had an antecedent goal of
acting precisely the way that D.S. demanded or wished. If so, then D.S.’s
impositions, although successful in generating conforming behavior, did not
leave G.M. subject to D.S. in the way that a coercion-based defense requires.
Third, perhaps D.S. succeeded in obtaining control over G.M.’s
decisional interests regarding law compliance but not over less important
interests. If so, then G.M. would be ineligible for a coercion-based defense
because D.S.’s control was not sufficiently robust.
However, if D.S. succeeded in controlling D.S.’s practical deliberation
and exercised this control robustly, then G.M. should be eligible for a
coercion-based defense to charges of prostitution, criminal trespassing, and
possession of drugs. Moreover, this defense would apply in all of the variants
of G.M.’s case described above. In other words, G.M.’s eligibility would not
depend on whether D.S. specifically threatened her (as in GM2) or not (as in
GM1), whether G.M. felt pressure to do as D.S. threatened (as in GM3) or
not (as in GM4), or whether G.M. would otherwise have been subject to
similar external pressure to commit these crimes (as in GM6) or not (as in
GM5).
The enforcement approach is superior to the wrongful pressure
approach as an account of how coercion operates and why coercion is wrong.
221

See People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
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The enforcement approach focuses attention on the powers and intentions of
the coercer, rather than on the psychological situation of the target. Coercion
is an attempt by the coercer to usurp decision-making power of the target,
rather than the coercer’s successful effort to exert pressure over the target.
While prior elaborations of the enforcement approach have primarily
addressed the issue of what makes coercion wrong, our analysis extends the
enforcement approach to the topic of coercion-based defenses. A defendant
should be entitled to a coercion-based defense when the coercer has usurped
the target’s decisional authority—that is, when the coercer has usurped
control over the target’s decision about what to do.
V. THE ENFORCEMENT APPROACH: IMPLICATIONS FOR
COERCION-BASED DEFENSES
This Part describes some practical implications of the enforcement
approach. Section A proposes a model affirmative defense to criminal
liability that is triggered by coercive control while Section B explains how
this model defense differs from the traditional coercion-based defenses,
which would remain on the books even if states adopted the proposed
defense.
A. A MODEL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOR COERCIVE CONTROL

What follows is a model affirmative defense for coercively controlled
persons. This defense assumes that the jurisdiction has adopted the criminal
offense of coercive control described above in Part I Section B.222
(1) A criminal Defendant shall have an affirmative defense to an offense
when:
a.) over a substantial period of time, another person engaged in a
pattern of coercive control223 over the Defendant that usurped the
Defendant’s decision making; OR
b.) another person exploited a position of power over the Defendant,
for which the Defendant is not at fault, that usurped the Defendant’s
decision making; AND
c.) in committing the offense, the Defendant acted at the direction of
the third party or within the ambit of the third party’s coercive control;
AND
222

See supra.
The definition of “coercive control” in the model defense should appear in a
separate statute making coercive control a criminal offense. We advocate and describe
such an offense in Section I(B). See discussion supra.
223
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d.) the seriousness of the Defendant’s offense does not significantly
exceed the degree of control exercised by the third party.
This coercive control affirmative defense would supplement, rather than
supplant, other coercion-based defenses such as duress and human trafficking
affirmative defenses. Moreover, this defense is freestanding of the coercive
controller’s liability. A defendant may assert the proposed coercive control
defense even if the coercive controller is not charged with any criminal
offense. This proposal does not revise the burden of proof aspects of
affirmative defenses. The same allocation of the burden of persuasion and
standard of proof should apply to the coercive control affirmative defense as
applied to other affirmative defenses in a jurisdiction.
Examining some of the key terms of this model affirmative defense can
both elaborate what the defense means and explain how it connects with the
enforcement approach to coercion.224
Pattern. The “pattern” requirement captures the diachronic nature of
coercive control. While coercive controllers may engage in individual acts of
physical violence or threats against their victims, coercive control can persist
even when the abuser does not directly interact with the target. This model
defense does not enumerate a comprehensive list of behaviors that constitute
coercive control. Rather, whether a pattern of conduct constitutes coercive
control is a question for the factfinder.225 This fact sensitivity entails that, in
the G.M. case, D.S.’s history of abuse against G.M. provides grounds for
attributing coercive significance to details (such as the threat to harm G.M.’s
close friend even though G.M. was in another country) that would not
constitute legally sufficient coercion in the absence of such a history.
224

While the model defense is deeply connected to the enforcement approach to
coercion in the ways described below, it also seems possible to justify the model defense
based on some version of the wrongful pressure approach. In reviewing a draft of this
article, several readers suggested a revised version of the wrongful pressure approach that
might support the model defense. First, the wrongful pressure approach might invoke the
notion of implicit threats to allow a coercer’s invocation or exploitation of a historical
pattern of domination of the target. Moreover, a broader range of experiences by the
target (including purely normative violations) might count as pressure. We think that most
advocates of the wrongful pressure approach would reject these revisions. In any event,
these revisions would move the wrongful pressure approach closer to the enforcement
approach (for example, by defining coercion largely from the perspective of the coercer).
Moreover, the intelligibility of these potential revisions suggest that it is possible to
ground the model defense, or something like it, on a model of coercion as wrongful
pressure.
225
See Sheley, supra note 46, at 1391. It seems entirely possible (and, indeed,
consistent with legality considerations) that the definition of coercion for the coercive
control defense could be broader than the definition for the offense of coercive control.
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Likewise, the requirement that coercive control take place over a
“substantial period of time” limits the defense only to temporally extended
instances of coercion. More synchronic instances of coercion can be dealt
with under other coercion-based defenses, such as duress. Longevity is
fundamental to coercive control, however, because the trauma bond between
a target and an abusive party occurs after a grooming process involving “a
mixture of reward . . . and punishment . . . freedom and bondage, acceptance
and degradation . . . .”226 The inquiry here is meant to invoke the “pattern of
racketeering activity” element of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).227 The Organized Crime Control Act (1970),
which includes RICO, provides that “criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.”228 The Supreme
Court characterized this requirement as a “relationship” element and held that
the statute further requires a “continuity” element, “referring either to a
closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature
projects into the future with athreat of repetition.”229 The model defense’s
“substantial period of time” requirement would raise a similar inquiry, one
that can be answered by examining an abuser’s temporally extended efforts
to assert control over the defendant.
These “pattern” and “substantial period of time” elements distinguish
the coercive control affirmative defense from canonical duress. For example,
although the Toscano case is a clear example of canonical duress, Toscano
would not straightforwardly satisfy the elements for our model defense
against conspiracy charges. Based on the court’s opinion, William
Leonardo’s coercion of Toscano arose from a discrete threat rather than a
temporarily extended effort to exert control.230 However, Toscano might be
eligible for our model affirmative defense if it were established that Leonardo
exerted more pervasive or programmatic forms of control over Toscano prior
to the formation of the conspiracy.
Position of Power. The “position of power” basis for the defense
recognizes that some parties may coerce others simply by exploiting
asymmetric power relations arising out of otherwise-legitimate roles. Roles
226
Joan A. Reid, Doors Wide Shut: Barriers to the Successful Delivery of Victim
Services for Domestically Trafficked Minors in a Southern U.S. Metropolitan Area, 20
W OMEN & CRIM . JUST. 147, 158 (2010).
227
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
228
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).
229
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1989).
230
See State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1977).
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that seem ripe for this kind of leveraging include prison guards, police
officers, teachers, and employers. Leveraging arises when one party exploits
a power asymmetry for their own purposes.231 The “position of power” and
“pattern” requirements are disjunctive: establishing eligibility for a coercive
control affirmative defense under the “position of power” route does not
require showing a pattern or extended period of interaction between the
coercer and the target. The proviso that the extant position of power not be
attributable to the defendant’s choice forecloses the defense applying in cases
where the Defendant’s criminal activity was an aspect of a prior choice to
enter into a power relation with a third party that the defendant knew or
intended would involve criminal activity.232
Usurp the Defendant’s Decision Making. This aspect of the model
defense most explicitly invokes the enforcement approach to coercion
discussed in Part III. On Professor Anderson’s logic, coercion is not a
“success” term—whether an imposition counts as coercion is assessed
entirely from the perspective of the coercer, rather than from the perspective
of the target (as under the wrongful pressure approach). However, under our
extension of Professor Anderson’s logic, a target is eligible for a coercionbased defense only if the coercer succeeds in robustly commandeering the
decision-making capacity of the target. The term “usurpation” indicates the
231

See Aleksandra Cislak, Adrian Dominik Wojcik & Natalia Frankowska1, Power
Corrupts but Control Does Not: What Stands Behind the Effects of Holding High Positions,
44 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULLETIN 944, 945 (2018).
232
That said, the model defense does not amount to a “tracing” account of moral
responsibility. Under tracing account, an agent can be attributed responsibility for an
action at T2 despite failing to satisfy the responsibility attribution criteria for that action,
as long as the agent satisfies the responsibility attribution criteria for an action at T1 that
is connected to T2. See Craig Agule, Resisting Tracing’s Siren Song, 10 J. ETHICS & SOC.
PHIL. 1, 1 (2016). On tracing accounts, the agent’s responsibility for the action at T1
grounds their responsibility for the action at T2. For example, on a tracing account G.M.
would not be eligible for a coercion-based defense for her offenses (regardless of whether
she satisfied the responsibility attribution criteria for those offenses) if (a) her commission
of those offenses was connected to her decision to engage in a relationship with D.S.; and
(b) G.M.’s decision to engage in a relationship with D.S. satisfied the appropriate criteria
of responsibility. Under the model defense, by contrast, historical facts about the agent’s
decisions are only relevant to the question of whether the agent’s decisional authority was
usurped in the first place. On a tracing model, historical facts ground responsibility for a
present action, while on the proposed defense historical facts only provide evidence about
whether the coercer’s actions commandeered the target’s decisional authority. To
illustrate, under the model defense, G.M. would not be eligible for a coercive control
defense if G.M. entered the relationship with D.S. in order to facilitate her engaging in
drug-related criminal activities. However, unlike on a tracing account, G.M. could
be eligible for a coercive control defense even if her entering the relationship with D.S.
satisfied the appropriate criteria of responsibility. Thanks to Craig Agule for suggesting
the need for this clarification.
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success condition applicable to coercion-based defenses that does not
necessarily apply to coercion-based offenses. Usurpation is both a factual and
a normative inquiry. A coercer usurps a target’s decisional authority when
the coercer in fact acquires a robust power to compel the target’s decision
about what to do via changing the target’s reasons to act as the coercer
wishes. This condition is not satisfied if the coercer does not actually acquire
power over the target (for example, in the case of rebuffed threats), or if the
coercer’s power over the target does not change the target’s reasons to act as
the coercer wishes (e.g., in cases of advice), or if the power over the target is
not robust (i.e., in which the coercer lacks the capacity to “track” the target’s
reasons for action across a range of possible worlds).
From an evidentiary perspective, the question of whether a particular
pattern evinces a usurpation of the target’s decision-making capacity may
turn on both lay and expert testimony. While evidentiary rules generally
prevent psychiatric experts from testifying as to a defendant’s state of mind,
as an ultimate issue reserved for the factfinder,233 such rules do not prevent
an appropriately qualified expert from testifying about the intent suggested
by the observable behavior of a non-party, or at least to the intention behind
and symptoms of coercive control generally. An expert could further testify
to the sorts of behaviors abusers commonly engage in that evince these
intentions, and external signs that they have been successful, in order for the
jury to compare them with the facts of the case.
The likely role of such testimony in resolving the issue of usurpation
parallels the role of experts in establishing the insanity defense. Indeed, the
similarity between proving coercion-based and insanity defenses is evinced
by the commentary to Section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which
notes that the duress defense could apply to circumstances of
“brainwashing,” or the “process by which an individual’s capacity to act of
his own volition is impaired” through “physical and emotional assaults upon
the individual, occasional rewards for responding to directions, a demand for
renunciation of past values, and reeducation (indoctrination) to the new ideas
of the brainwasher.”234 The MPC commentary contends that this
“brainwashing” variety of the duress defense would be established in exactly
the way that duress via threats of physical force would be established.235
233

See, e.g., FED . R. EVID . 704.
See M ODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, supra note 75, at 376 n.40.
235
Id. at 376–77 (“First, suppose that by the continued use of unlawful force, persons
effectively break down the personality of the actor, rendering him submissive to whatever
suggestions they make. They then, using neither force nor threat of force on that occasion,
suggest that he perform a criminal act; and the actor does what they suggest. The
‘brainwashed’ actor would not be barred from claiming the defense of duress, since he
234
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While, overall, the MPC’s theory of duress reflects the wrongful pressure
approach, the “brainwashing” variety of duress contemplated by the MPC
captures the diachronic nature of coercive control by positing a state of mind
in which the defendant does not experience pressure from the coercer because
of a prolonged state of subordination. The MPC also allows that the “effects
of such brainwashing efforts upon a defendant might be severe enough to
give rise to other defenses to a charge of crime, such as insanity.”236 This
allowance suggests that expert testimony could help establish the
phenomenon of brainwashing in the same ways that expert testimony could
be relevant to establish the phenomenon of insanity: under the MPC, expert
testimony can be relevant to establishing the “volitional” prong of the
insanity defense, and expert testimony seems just as relevant to establishing
whether a coercer’s impositions have usurped a target’s decision-making
capacities.237 That said, expert testimony would not be the only means by
which a defendant could make out this element. The target’s testimony and
that of lay witnesses who observed the coercive controller’s conduct could
be sufficient to satisfy the usurpation element.
At the Direction or Within the Ambit of the Third Party’s Coercive
Control. An obvious objection to our model affirmative defense is that it risks
diminishing the target’s agency. On this objection (which resembles
objections raised to “battered woman syndrome” defenses),238 the model
defense might indicate that to be subject to coercive control in some aspects
of one’s life is to have one’s agency compromised generally. If so, then the
model defense might have the perverse effect of compounding a target’s
degradation.
To forestall this objection, the model defense will only be available to
criminal actions that are either at the direction of the coercive controller or
within the ambit of the coercive control. This “direction or ambit” proviso is

may assert that he was ‘coerced’ to perform the act by the use of unlawful force on his
person. He might also argue that he is responding to earlier threats to use unlawful force
that have rendered him submissive to those who made the threats because he still
subconsciously fears they will be carried out.”).
236
Id. at 376 n.40.
237
To be sure, the Model Penal Code’s reasoning is not directly apposite to our
point, since the MPC explicitly adopts the wrongful pressure approach to coercion in its
formulation of the duress defense (including the “brainwashing” variety of duress).
Rather, our point is that the MPC’s parallel between the process of establishing duress
and that of establishing insanity is likely to hold for our proposed coercive control
affirmative defense.
238
See, e.g., Anne Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV . 1, 5 (1994); Sharon
Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 193
(1991).
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a type of nexus requirement, albeit one that is considerably broader than the
test applicable in canonical duress (i.e., that pressure to act in a particular
way arise out of the coercer’s threat)239 or in many human trafficking duress
statutes that apply only to crimes committed “as a direct result of” being
human trafficked.240 Unlike for canonical duress, the defendant need not
show a specific connection between their criminal activity and a threat from
a coercer in order to be eligible for the coercive control affirmative defense.
Such a showing would be sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the
coercive control defense. The “direction or ambit” test would allow coercion
to be inferred from the entirety of the relationship between the coercer and
the target, rather than solely from the relations in effect at the time of the
threat.
Likewise, the “direction or ambit” test is broader than the “direct result”
test since a criminal action can be within the ambit of coercive control
without being the direct result of coercive control. Consider a version of G.M.
in which her first client of the day fails to show up at the appointed location
while D.S. is waiting outside in the car, expecting her to return with a certain
amount of money. G.M. steals the wallet of her second client in order to
return with the amount of money D.S. had anticipated. While G.M.’s effort
would not qualify for the affirmative defense under the “direction” prong
because D.S. did not command G.M.to steal the wallet, it would fall within
the “ambit” of D.S.’s control.241
The “direction or ambit” proviso is analogous to the rule of vicarious
liability for participants in a conspiracy that “any conspirator in a continuing
conspiracy is responsible for the illegal acts committed by his cohorts in
furtherance of the conspiracy, within the scope of the conspiracy, and
reasonably foreseeable by the conspirators as a necessary or natural
consequence of the unlawful agreement.”242 Just as the scope of the offense
of conspiracy is defined by the joint intentions of the parties, the scope of the
coercive control affirmative defense is a function of the coercer’s intentions.
239

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
241
By contrast, consider a hypothetical scenario in which a wife subject to a similar
pattern of coercive control to that imposed on G.M. by D.S. sneaks away from home for
an afternoon to spend time with a friend. After heavy drinking, the wife strikes and kills
a pedestrian on the way home. Because the husband, like D.S., explicitly sought to isolate
her from other people, restrict her spending, and control her mobility by driving her
everywhere, these activities would fall outside the ambit of his control. Thus, on our logic,
the coercive control defense would not apply to charges of vehicular manslaughter in this
scenario.
242
James M. Branden, White Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law: Substantive
Crimes, 24 AM . CRIM . L. REV . 459, 485 (1987).
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Proportionality. The proposed statute requires proportionality between
the defendant’s offense and the severity of the third party’s coercive control.
This requirement reflects the notion, discussed above, that eligibility for a
coercion-based defense turns on a normative assessment of the target’s
interest in making certain types of decisions (especially regarding law
compliance). Thus, the proportionality requirement resembles the limitations
on the duress defense for particular offenses. In particular, duress is not a
defense to murder at common law243 and under the laws of many U.S.
states.244 The proportionality requirement in the coercive control defense is
intended to provide greater flexibility for factfinders in cases where the facts
show that the defendant’s particular conditions at the time of the offense were
extreme enough to warrant an excuse even for the most serious crimes.245 A
state could adopt the model coercive control defense but choose to exclude
cases of murder or whatever other offenses fall under that state’s duress
defense in order to harmonize it with existing law.
In jurisdictions with existing proportionality constraints in their duress
defenses, the proportionality prong of the coercive control defense could
operate in parallel, to harmonize the complementary coercion-based
defenses. For example, in jurisdictions where duress is a defense to murder,
then coercive control could also be a defense to murder. However, asserting
coercive control as a defense to murder would require a stronger level of
proof of usurpation of decision-making than would be required to assert
coercive control as a defense to less serious offenses.
B. DISTINGUISHING COERCIVE CONTROL FROM OTHER
COERCION-BASED DEFENSES

The circumstances giving rise to a coercive control defense may overlap
with or resemble those in which other coercion-based defenses are
appropriate. This section distinguishes and compares the proposed coercive
control defense with other coercion-based defenses.
Duress. The canonical formulation of the duress defense does not cover
all of the circumstances in which coercion should morally excuse a criminal
243

See Dressler, supra note 24, at 1335.
See LA FAVE, supra note 72, § 9.7(b) (concluding that “about half” of
contemporary U.S. jurisdictions that have a duress defense “do not allow the defense
if the defendant has been charged with murder”).
245
For the version of this argument in the context of duress, see Mulroy, supra note
74, at 175 (“While it may be true in many situations that a person threatened with
death ought to have the fortitude to resist killing an innocent third party, can it really be
that are never any situations in which a defendant’s eventual submission to the threats is
understandable enough to allow an excuse under the law?”).
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offense. Neither does coercive control cover all situations in which a defense
of duress should apply—for example, the paradigmatic situation of the armed
robber saying, “do X or I’ll shoot.” Thus, the coercive control and duress
defenses would exist in parallel and differ in several significant ways. Many
of the most important differences between the duress defense and the model
coercive control defense arise out of the latter’s embrace of the enforcement
approach to coercion.
First, coercive control has a broader nexus requirement than duress.
Where duress requires a showing that a coercer’s specific threat precedes and
causes the defendant’s criminal action,246 coercive control requires a showing
that the coercer has usurped the defendant’s decision-making. Some
usurpations are triggered (at least in part) by threats, but not all are. Nor does
the coercive control defense require a strict causal relationship between the
coercer’s usurpation and the defendant’s action.
Second, while duress requires that the consequence of the coercer’s
threat be immediate,247 the coercive control defense has no strict immediacy
requirement. This is due to the diachronic effects of oppression in altering a
target’s perceptions of immediacy. For example, D.S. threatening to kill
G.M.’s friend, who was in another country at the time of the threat,248 might
well have appeared immediate to G.M. in a way that it would not have
appeared to someone who was not subject to long-term coercive control. The
immediacy of threatened harm would be relevant, however, to assessing a
duress defense where the relationship between the coercer and the target was
more attenuated and the threat provided the sole basis for coercion.
Third, duress requires that, as an objective matter, the defendant has no
way of avoiding the harm threatened by the coercer.249 In the coercive control
defense, questions of necessity should be determined relative to the
particular dynamic of coercive control between the parties. In turn, this
accounts for the prevalence of the type of “trauma bonding” in which a victim
feels helpless to escape from the control of the coercive controller. Evidence
that a trauma bond between the parties has resulted in the defendant
perceiving an absence of escape paths is relevant to the usurpation question
that is central to the coercive control defense.
Human Trafficking Affirmative Defenses. The coercive control
defense would significantly expand the protections afforded to victims of
human trafficking under most existing human trafficking statutes in the
246
247
248
249

See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
See Finkelstein, supra note 72, at 254.
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
See Finkelstein, supra note 72, at 254.
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United States. As noted above, most human trafficking affirmative defenses
contain both an offense restriction (usually limiting the defense to crimes
related to sex work) and a narrow nexus requirement (for example, requiring
a showing that the offense was the “direct product” of being trafficked).250
The model coercive control defense would resemble the human trafficking
affirmative defense available under Oklahoma law as it would not contain
any offense restriction and would have a broad nexus requirement. That said,
the coercive control defense would not entirely displace the human
trafficking affirmative defense. Certain forms of human trafficking (for
example, those involving forced labor) involve episodic threats rather than
the diachronic mode of coercion that characterizes coercive control.
Likewise, certain forms of coercive control (for example, the kind that
might support the inference that the target failed to protect a child from
the controller’s abuse and neglect) do not trigger human trafficking statutes
because they do not implicate the sex trafficking or labor trafficking elements
of liability for human trafficking offenses in most United States
jurisdictions.251 Therefore, the model coercive control defense would
supplement, rather than displace, existing human trafficking affirmative
defenses.
Abused Spouse Syndrome. The coercive control defense shares some
scientific bases with the so-called “abused spouse syndrome” defense
(originally the “battered woman syndrome” or “BWS” defense).252 The BWS
defense is a controversial theory of self-defense that justifies (rather than
excuses) a defendant’s killing of their attacker or of another person as a
“defense of others” defense. At common law, self-defense requires many of
the same elements as common law duress: the threat of bodily peril that is
imminent and a necessity for the defendant to use force, all measured on a
reasonableness standard.253 The BWS defense does not change those
elements but, rather, allows the defendant to argue that circumstances of
domestic abuse are relevant to the interpretation of the “imminence” and
“reasonableness” elements.254 Domestic violence survivors experience the
kinds of learned helplessness and trauma bonding that arise in connection
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See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1465 § 112(a)(2); see also Dahlstrom, supra note 64, at 415–17 (describing
state human trafficking statutes).
252
See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self Defense Claims, 67 OR. L.
REV . 393, 396–408 (1988).
253
See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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See Kinports, supra note 252, at 408–22.
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with coercive control.255 The BWS defense allows the defendant to argue that
the “necessity” of their use of force and its “reasonableness” should be
determined in light of the very real experience of helplessness, and not by
whether a “reasonable person” would have felt he had no other alternatives
in the situation.256 Furthermore, the literature on BWS explains how the
“cyclical” nature of domestic violence is relevant to whether the
“imminence” requirement is met.257 A long-term victim of domestic violence
gains experience predicting when the next violent phase of her abuser’s cycle
is about to commence, thus reasonably perceiving it as imminent when
someone without her experience would not.258 The BWS defense
(particularly prior to its gender-neutral relabeling) draws criticism from
feminist scholars who argue that the defense institutionalized negative
stereotypes of women by staging the “reasonable woman” as objectively
helpless.259
While the BWS defense and the coercive control defense utilize some
of the same psychological and sociological concepts, the legal significance
of these defenses is distinct. The coercive control defense applies to all
crimes committed by the defendant, not merely the killing or harming of the
coercer. Furthermore, the BWS defense largely operates on a synchronous
model of coercion that is reflected in the wrongful pressure approach. The
relevant inquiry in self-defense is what the defendant reasonably believes in
the moment of the killing. While the BWS defense renders longer-term
contextual information about the abusive relationship relevant to the in-themoment inquiry, the test nonetheless turns on whether the defendant in fact
reasonably apprehended an imminent threat to their person sufficient enough
to return with deadly force. By contrast, the coercive control defense rests on
an assessment of the defendant’s decision-making in light of a long-term
pattern of behavior by the coercer. Likewise, because the coercive control
defense rests on an enforcement approach to coercion, the relevant inquiry is
framed in terms of usurpation rather than pressure.
Because of these differences in application and fundamentals, the
coercive control defense avoids many of the criticisms made against BWS.
255
See generally Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2
VICTIMOLOGY 525 (1977) (explaining how domestic abuse contributes to a victim’s
psychological paralysis).
256
See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 457, 463 (2006).
257
See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95–96 (1984).
258
Id.
259
See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 238, at 5; Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of
Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 137
(1985).
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For example, the coercive control defense does not ask the factfinder to
construct a “reasonable person” and then frame the battered spouse as
deviating from this standard because of gendered patterns of abuse.260 Rather,
the coercive control defense asks how the conduct of the coercer affected the
defendant’s decision-making capacity around relevant spheres of action. The
relevant inquiry is not “how do reasonable battered women behave,” so much
as “what was the nature of the particular relationship between this coercer
and this target?”
“Marital Coercion” and Other Status-Based Defenses. The focus on
the agency of the coercer distinguishes the proposed coercive control defense
from ostensibly related phenomena, such as the defense of “marital coercion”
under common law doctrine of coverture. The marital coercion defense held
that “for some crimes, married women acting in the presence of their spouses
might not be held accountable, based not on a notion of unity but on
subordination and coercion.”261 As described by James Fitzjames Stephen,
the doctrine held that
If a married woman commits . . . theft or receives stolen goods . . . in the presence of
her husband, she is presumed to have acted under his coercion, and such coercion
excuses her act; but this presumption may be rebutted if the circumstances of the case
show that in point of fact she was not coerced.262

The presumptive application of the marital coercion defense, which was
abolished in England in 1925,263 enacted a “legal subservience” on the
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For an account of the problems with such a narrative see Naomi R. Cahn,
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice,
77 CORNELL L. REV . 1398, 1402–03 (1992) (“While its use may empower some women,
in the practical reality of the attorney-client relationship and in the courtroom, the
reasonable women standard both encourages client passivity and ignores the complexities
of the client’s situation. Moreover, the use of separate standards operates to entrench
differences between men and women, rather than to establish a standard that transcends
issues of sameness and difference.”).
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Marisha Caswell, Coverture and the Criminal Law in England, 1640-1760, in
MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 88,
88 (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds., 2013); see also Benjamin Paul, The Doctrine
of Marital Coercion, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 190, 193 (1956) (noting that majority of U.S. states
at the time of writing allow “the woman to assert her coverture and defend [against
criminal liability] on the ground of marital coercion”).
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JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105 (1883)
263
Emily Ireland, Rebutting the Presumption: Rethinking the Common Law Principle
of Marital Coercion in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England, 40 J. LEGAL HIST.
21, 43 (2019).
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married woman by interpreting her actions as “solely because of her
husband’s coercion.”264
The marital coercion defense, like the doctrine of coverture more
broadly, was a demeaning legal notion.265 It adopted a normative position
about the coerciveness of marriage, in both the deontological and statistical
senses of that term—husbands ought to control their wives, and most
husbands do.266 The coercive control defense adopts neither such a
deontological nor statistical position about how relationships work.
Consistent with the enforcement approach to coercion, asserting the
coercive control defense inquiries into the putative coercer’s actual pattern
of control over the target, as well as a normative assessment of the target’s
exercise of agency. The animating rationale behind the coercive control
defense is not the proposition that wives should be subordinate to their
husbands, but rather that no one should demean anyone in the way that the
coercive controller demeans the target. To assert a coercive control defense
against a coercer is no more demeaning than to assert a criminal complaint
for a coercion-based offense such as blackmail, extortion, or kidnapping.
CONCLUSION
Duress and other coercion-based defenses are ill-suited to coercive
control contexts. This failure stems from the notion of coercion that underlies
most contemporary legal thinking about duress, one that construes coercion
as a form of wrongfully imposing pressure on a target. The enforcement
approach provides an alternative, more plausible model that frames coercion
in terms of the coercer’s usurpation of the target’s decisional authority.
Adopting the enforcement approach to coercion and extending its logic to
coercion-based defenses would give rise to a novel criminal defense for those
subject to coercive control, one that resembles the human trafficking
affirmative defense that is notionally available in Oklahoma.
264
David Rosenberg, Coverture in Criminal Law: Ancient Defender of Married
Women Notes, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV . 83, 83 (1973).
265
There is reason to doubt whether the marital coercion defense was as demeaning
in practice as it appeared on the books. As one historian notes, by the nineteenth
century treatise writers in England “recognized a wife may possess agency separate to her
spouse, and began to flesh out examples of how a wife may demonstrate independence or
power over her husband.” Ireland, supra note 263, at 41.
266
See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 238, at 33–34 (contending that the resilience of the
marital coercion doctrine indicates the “strength and longevity of the law’s commitment
to the hierarchical nature of the marriage relationship” and reflected recognition by judges
that “marriage was the dominant social institution in women’s lives and that the husband,
and not any process of the criminal law, had been assigned the leading role in controlling
women’s misconduct”).
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Addressing coercive control cases requires rethinking the predominant
legal notion of coercion. Vindicating the enforcement approach in coercive
control contexts might lead to a more widespread rethinking of how coercion
matters in criminal law.
However, the rethinking of coercion-based defenses that this Article
proposes is compatible with, and perhaps called for by, movements to
construe criminal law theory in terms of political philosophy.267 It is often
noted that human trafficking affirmative defenses are appropriate because
trafficked persons are victims of crime.268 Legitimate states claim a
monopoly on the use of force.269 On many theories of political legitimacy,
this claim gives rise to a state’s duty to protect those subject to its authority
from encroachments of others, including coercion.270 A state that fails to
protect those subject to its authority from such private coercion has
committed an injustice that can undermine its legitimacy.271 Just as the notion
267

See VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE vii
(2018) (“[A]ssociated institutions are . . . subject to the same principles of institutional
and political evaluation that apply to public law and political institutions generally”);
Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV . 1017, 1041 (2014) (“[A] theory of state
punishment needs a theory of the state, whether original or borrowed.”). For a broader
overview of the position that criminal law is a topic in political philosophy, see Stephen
Galoob, Criminal Law and/as Political Theory, 55 TULSA L. REV . 203 (2020).
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See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 71, at 208 (noting that “criminal law too often
punishes victims” of sex trafficking “rather than those who victimize them”); see also
OKLA . STAT. tit. 21, § 748.2(a)(2) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 58th Leg. (2021))
(noting that human trafficking victims shall “not be detained in facilities inappropriate to
their status as crime victims”).
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See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, The Law as a Specific Social Technique, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 75,
81 (1941) (“The individual who, authorized by the legal order, applies the coercive
measure (the sanction), acts as an organ of this order, or of the community constituted
thereby. And hence one may say that law makes the use of force a monopoly of the
community.”); CHRISTOPHER M ORRIS, AN ESSAY ON THE M ODERN STATE 14 (1998) (“In
theory . . . states are ‘sovereign’ in their territories, and they claim a monopoly on the
use of legitimate force therein. This is held to distinguish states from the Mafia or
multinational corporations.”).
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See, e.g., ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 174 (2018) (“Law enforcement practices are worthy of our respect and
cooperation only when they are reasonably successful at arresting and prosecuting people
for committing what are and ought to be crimes, at morally acceptable costs to all parties
involved, including defendants.”).
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Stephen Galoob & Stephen Winter, Injustice, Reparation, and Legitimacy, 5
OXFORD STUD. IN POL. PHIL. 65, 70–71 (2019) (describing the “general delegitimating
effect” of injustices, whereby injustices perpetuated against some groups compromise a
state’s right to rule more broadly); Anderson, supra note 30, at 29 (“A state that wishes
to claim legitimate authority will need to protect individuals from the coercion of others
as well as to avoid unjust coercion of its own. If people are not able to depend on state
protection against the coercion of others, this has long been thought to reduce or eliminate
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of self-defense can be vindicated in terms of the state’s failure to provide the
defender with protection from an unlawful threat,272 so too can coercionbased defenses can be justified in terms of the state’s failure to protect targets
from wrongful or unlawful coercion. Because those subject to coercive
control and other coercive threats are survivors of serious wrongs and crimes,
providing a broad defense to criminal liability in the wake of coercion can be
seen as a requirement of political legitimacy. One prominent understanding
of coercion-based defenses, such as duress, is that they are justified where
and to the extent that the defendant lacked a fair opportunity to avoid criminal
wrongdoing owing to the unfairness of a choice situation.273 On a political
understanding of coercion-based defenses, by contrast, the availability of a
duress defense would turn on an assessment of the state’s failure to protect
the target of coercion and the reasonableness of the target’s lawbreaking in
the wake of such a failure.
To outline such a political theory of criminal law defenses is not to argue
for it. That said, reconceiving coercion along the lines proposed here might
invite a broader rethinking of criminal law defenses and criminal law itself.

the state’s authority to command those people, since in effect a new sovereign has taken
up reign over them . . . .”).
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See, e.g., John Gardner, Criminals in Uniform, in THE CONSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL
LAW 97, 114 (R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzon & Victor
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justification or excuse”); Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as Public Law, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 21, 36 (Antony Duff & Stuart P. Green
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discharge his duties that ordinary citizens are entitled to act”).
273
See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 24, at 1365 (“Duress excuses when the available
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